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Executive PhD

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STRENGTHENING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Can presidential power change the narrative?

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"Africa doesn't need strongmen; it needs strong institutions."

From the speech of President Barack Obama to the Parliament of Ghana, July 2009

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To my husband, Jeff Mbuyi Tshiyombo, thank you for pushing me and being my cheerleader. I would not have applied to the EDBA without your constant checking on my application, on my research progress, on putting me on a plane when I was exhausted, and on parenting alone when I just needed it the most to make progress. This thesis could not have been completed without you being my timekeeper and my informal reviewer.

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ABSTRACT

This research aims to understand the influence of presidential power in strengthening public institutions, with a comparative analysis of eight selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1970 to 2018. The work is based on the academic literature from Acemoglu and Al. (2012) on understanding the underlying causes of economic growth; from Yeboah-Assiamah (2016) on the relationship between strong personalities and strong institutions; and from Araya (2020) on including presidents' personalities as an independent variable to evaluate their influence on public institutions. The analysis utilizes the Paradigm of Leadership Value Continuum of Nieburg (1991), who studied the work of five scholars. The formers categorized the leadership styles of American presidents on a scale ranging from pure authority to pure service. The research uses time as a pillar of the quality of public institutions. Secondary data from reputable institutions, which track governance and political indicators every year, are utilized to support the analysis of the relationship between presidential power and the quality of public institutions as defined in the realm of the research. The findings imply that presidents influence the quality of public institutions. It argues that presidents with personality traits of "Service" have a positive influence on improving the quality of public institutions, even if the change is in small increments, as system constraints reduce the influence of presidential power. It recommends more research on the personality traits of heads of state to inform electors about the potential impact of their votes and to support the work of practitioners on providing sustainable development solutions.

I.   PRESENTATION OF THE BIG ISSUE

a. Personal experience

I cannot start drafting the big issue without talking about why the subject matters on a personnel level. Born and primarily raised in Mali, one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, I spent my first years of school in Lille, Northern France. When we returned to Mali, as a preteen, I was shocked by the economic disparity between the two countries. The differences have always left me perplexed and have motivated me to seek answers which would allow me to comprehend the development gap between countries. Having the opportunity to study abroad and travel internationally, I got to witness firsthand the difference between the haves and have-nots. The 2019 GDP per capita supports this affirmation – 14 out of the 15 lowest per capita incomes were in Sub-Saharan Africa, averaging $544 while the 15 wealthiest countries averaged $95,658 during the same period. The average in Africa was also below the World's per capita income of $11,442 [1] (Figure 1).

Today, more than ever, the world is a global village composed of 195 countries, each with its own identities, values, cultures, religions, and diversity in its population. Despite those differences in beliefs and systems, countries are intertwined and the lack of stability in one country may affect the stability of one region, one continent, or the world. As a result, it is critical to elevate the lives of those countries that have been lagging in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) and economic growth. The countries most afflicted by socio-economic and political instabilities have been in Africa.

The inequality has increased my appetite to learn more about the gap, beyond the gray literature and the reports of development projects with limited implementation successes, and to understand the roots of the economic differences between nations, beyond colonization, slavery, and wars. More importantly, on a practical basis, I want to add to the academic work available to improve public service delivery in developing countries.

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[1] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.OOPC.CH.ZS?end=2002&start=2002

Figure 1 : Current Gross Domestic Product

Legend:
- North America
- OECD members
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- World
- Central Europe and the Baltics
- East Asia & Pacific
- Latin America & Caribbean
- Middle East & North Africa

Source: World Bank (2020)

b. Managerial issue

The continent of Africa is the most affected by poverty, low economic growth, civil wars, and political insecurities. The reasons may be linked to its chaotic history. Africa, scorned by slavery and colonization, has seen most of its countries become independent in the 50s and 60s. The newly found political freedom did not translate into the desired socio-economic growth that the first presidents and leaders aspired to achieve. As shown in Figure 1, Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest Gross Domestic Product per capita (US$ Current) and lags behind all the other regions of the world. As a result, in the 21st century, Africa is the continent the most dependent on economic aid, and governments have failed to provide public goods and services that foster productive and cost-effective environments for the private sector to thrive.

In Africa, the role of government is central to promoting economic growth by setting policies and by providing services such as the construction of infrastructures suited for key public sectors – health, education, food security, national security, transportation, and energy. Public investments in those areas are critical in nurturing a healthy and educated workforce and in facilitating communication and exchange among citizens within and outside the continent of Africa. While providing those public goods and services can be achieved through public investments, public resources are not spent efficiently in developing countries, especially in Africa where bad governance and corruption are endemic. Consequently, the causes for the delays in economic and social growth can be attributed to inefficiencies of the public sector, bad governance, corruption, and nepotism. Despite the above issues, governments in Africa remain, for now, the main engine of sustainable development. As such it is important to understand the real challenges faced by governments in some of the sectors highlighted below.

Among the priority sectors in the education sector where many inefficiencies exist, starting at the primary level, hence affecting the whole system including the quality of graduates produced by schools and universities. For instance, in April 2018, the journal *Jeune Afrique* published an article on the existence of zombie teachers and students in Mali resulting in the loss of millions of dollars per year by the Government of Mali in this sector. According to the article, the Ministry of Education published a report where the government-subsidized 10,000 nonexistent teachers out of the 16,000 identified in the survey. Furthermore, the attendance of some registered students was also not confirmed. The subsidy paid to absentee teachers and schools for zombie students created a loss of resources estimated at 12 million euros (approximately $ 13,400,000). In addition to

zombie teachers and students, the education sector in Mali faced the growing disparity between education availability in rural versus urban areas, gender discrimination, and prohibitive access costs to vulnerable populations. A better governance of the sector could help provide public education to a population in need of improved skills, especially when only 56% of eligible children were enrolled in primary school in 2017. The problem of zombie teachers was also reported in 2017 by the Government of Niger with an annual loss of 7.3 million euros (approximately $ 8,200,000), with primary school enrollment at 69% which was below the World's average of 89% and 100% for Europe and North America for instance[2]. These numbers can be concerning when human capital plays a central role in the theory of economic growth, and at the heart of it, is the necessity of starting with primary education (Blankenau & Simpson, 2004). As such it is important for African governments to lay out clear policies in the education sector and to ensure that public investments are maximized to the fullest.

The health sector does not fare better across the African continent. The lack of hospitals and qualified health professionals hurts productivity and wealth creation. According to the World Health Organization, out-of-pocket expenditures were less than 6% in Namibia, up to 60% in Ivory Coast and Chad with an average of 40% in 15 countries studied in sub-Saharan Africa in 2002. These costs were higher than out-of-pocket expenditures for the World which averaged 18.61%, 7.14% in France, 16.65% in the United Kingdom, and 14.31% in the United States[3]. In Cameroon, deficiencies in the healthcare system have been reported by many organizations in the sector. Among some of the reasons are the lack of qualified healthcare professionals and lack of equitable healthcare distribution, with major disparities between rural and non-rural areas. Furthermore, the high costs of healthcare make it inaccessible to many. In 2016, a pregnant woman died needlessly in Cameroon[4]. Doctors refused to treat her because she could not afford the costs of treatment. In addition to the unethical aspect of the situation, where the rule of law is too weak to sanction these types of actions, the lack of a health system that would allow emergency treatments was not available. The political elites, responsible for strengthening the public sector, do not receive their primary and emergency healthcare in the hospitals they oversee. Amid the Covid-19 pandemic, the Prime Minister of Ivory Coast, Amadou Gon Coulibaly, flew to France on the president's fleet

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[2] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR?end=2017&most_recent_value_desc=false&start=2015&view=chart
[3] https://apps.who.int/nha/database
[4] https://observers.france24.com/en/20160315-pregnant-woman-cameroon-hospital-ceasarian

for an emergency medical visit[5]. According to reports, "he did not want to take any chances". In his position, Prime Minister Coulibaly was responsible for the supervision of the team of Ministers, including the Minister of Health. Why couldn't he trust his government to set standards and provide resources to the healthcare sector? The case in Ivory Coast is not isolated. There is sufficient documentation about the African elites traveling to countries with better healthcare systems to receive the services they need. The consequence of the African healthcare tourism raises the question of the role of the government in establishing healthcare policies, providing subsidies to the most vulnerable population, setting a standard for health professionals, and building state of art healthcare infrastructures.

Infrastructure is important in a country's economic growth and private sector investment (Barro, 1990). Billions of dollars are spent in the sector – according to the World Bank outlook for 2040, $94 trillion will need to be invested by 2040 based on population growth and economic activities. The continent of Africa is expected to spend only $4.3 trillion over the same period or less than 4.6% of the current budget needed to keep up with growth. Among the highest costs when it comes to infrastructure building, thirty countries in Africa deal with regular power outages and pay a high price for emergency power. According to the World Bank data, only 47.20% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa had access to electricity in 2018 versus 100% in Europe, OCDE countries, and North America or 91.6% in South Asia[6]. According to the Brooking Institute, the average growth for Low Income and Fragile Countries was 4.6% in 2015. This number could be increased by 2.2% annually if needed. This differential is important as infrastructure also contributes to the growing gap in human development (Fay & Yepes, 2003). For instance, the availability of electricity and water in schools provides a healthier environment for children to study, especially girls who are forced to miss school during their periods in rural and urban areas. Availability of water helps decrease the incidence of diseases such as diarrhea, a leading cause of childhood mortality under 5 years old.

The above highlights on education, health, and infrastructure[7] sectors provide a glimpse of the issues faced by African governments. Because sectors are interconnected, weaknesses in one

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[5] https://www.theafricareport.com/27511/cote-divoire-why-prime-minister-coulibaly-is-at-hospital-in-france/
[6] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?most_recent_value_desc=false&view=chart
[7] Infrastructure is seen as a sector for development agencies – this is the definition used in the research given my professional background.

can negatively affect the other. This holds when it comes to national security. Many governments in Africa have not provided the political stability needed to ensure sustainable development. Countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Rwanda, and Uganda to name a few were ravaged by civil wars. Others like Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria are fighting the rise of terrorism on their territories and are faced with an increase in security expenditures, where military equipment and supplies are often acquired without a transparent procurement process in the name of national security. These instabilities create room for inefficiency in the planning and execution of sectoral projects and long-term socio-economic growth. The outcry from the population is increasing in the region – the August 2020 resignation of the Malian President[8], Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, forced out after months of protests for his inability to keep campaign promises and to reign on corruption, mostly from his closest circle, led to military action to end the social agony. Therefore, there is a cycle of never-ending stories of political destabilization, mainly because bad governance, corruption, and nepotism continue.

These developmental issues motivated me to increase my understanding of the issues faced by the continent and to explore the role of presidential power in strengthening public institutions – the lack of quality of those institutions seems to be one of the main weaknesses of African countries, including their inability to improve the social and economic welfare necessary to become reliable competitors on the world stage (Sub-Saharan Africa average a regional score of 32 out of 100 on the 2019 Transparency Index vs. 66/100 in Europe[9]).

c. Managerial interest

My interest in understanding presidential power in strengthening public institutions stems from my years of experience working in the field of international development in the execution and supervision of projects financed by the international community. Having provided technical assistance to governments and civil society organizations, I interact with professionals who want to see positive change in their countries, at all levels of the government, national and local, to improve the lives of their fellow countrymen. In most cases, those qualified professionals do not

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[8] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-security/mali-president-resigns-after-detention-by-military-deepening-crisis-idUSKCN25E1AF
[9] https://www.transparency.org/en/news/cpi-2019-global-highlights

have the political capital to influence change, always facing the likelihood that initiatives will later be rejected or be put on hold, awaiting official signatures, or the adoption of legal frameworks.

I work primarily in fragile states to implement reform agenda, a gigantic task where priorities are many and resources are limited. Governments often request financial and technical support to tackle inefficiencies, improve controls and transparency, promote the rule of law, avert corruption, and engage civil society organizations and the media when it comes to accountability. While many governments show the will to change, the reality says otherwise. Systems of weak controls, policies, and judicial systems create an environment favorable for government officials to maintain their power and to gain from the lack of transparency within the existing system.

When unable to move reforms at the central level, the international community has provided support to local governments on good governance and accountability by helping elected officials plan and execute their budgets while prioritizing the needs raised during community meetings on budget planning and local resource mobilization strategies, in line with services provided or to be provided. During my tenure as a Project Director for a Shared Governance Project in Mali, every effort was made to implement results-based budgeting at the local level in collaboration with mayors and targeted communities. However, the Ministry of Finance approved budgets were different from those drafted by local government officials. Elected officials and administrative staff were not aware of the final budget allocation as budget notes were not provided. Furthermore, most local-owned revenues were collected and redistributed by the Department of Treasury. As such, the role of the central government, especially of the decisions makers, heavily impacts local politics and policies. Local governments cannot work without supportive central governments. While decentralization policies have been in place, in practice they have not been implemented.

My experience in the field of international development has shown that beyond reports and lessons learned, new methodologies are needed to improve support in countries. The tendency by international organizations to provide, for the most part, one size fits all, has led to the failure of major initiatives and programs such as the Structural Adjustment Program led by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the 1990s. Those programs have compelled governments, striven by lack of resources, to accept proposals even when macroeconomic conditions were not favorable. Furthermore, reforms should not be forced on countries. Providing solutions and then

asking governments to take ownership of the capacity-building initiatives can be demotivating. Having a privileged relationship with the government means that the international community can provide better assistance to developing countries by supporting the production of more academic research in the African context.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

This section first reviews the work of scholars and the contribution of this research to the existing academic literature. It is followed by the theoretical specifications and their relevance in analysis. The section is completed with the definition of key concepts from related literature, including presidential leadership which operates within formal and informal systems of established institutions. The section closes with a summary of the literature review.

a. The Existing Work of Scholars

Empiric research on understanding the quality of institutions in economic development, sustainable growth, private sector development, financial markets, health, and education has been the topic of academic research to demonstrate that institutions matter in socio-economic development. When institutional qualities are weak, it creates an environment favorable for bad governance and corruption. This is supported by some of the examples such as zombie workers in Mali and Niger as presented on pages 9 et 10. Thus, the role of the public sector institution is an essential factor for a well-functioning and efficient society: "Institutions that guarantee property rights, a fair juridical system and the enforcement of contracts, together with efficient and transparent governments that warrant fair market competition and the provision of high-quality public services, contribute to creating a favorable business environment, based on certainty and stability" (Ganau & Al., 2019). In their article "Determinants of institutional quality: an empirical exploration", the authors defined the quality of institutions as follows (i) predictability to reduce uncertainties; (ii) static and dynamic efficiency which determines if rules and expectations help reduce transactional costs; (iii) adaptability to respond to social changes; and (iv) credibility and legitimacy for obeying societal rules (Alonso & Al, 2020). The rules of institutions are written by representatives of a given population who act as their agents to create the institutional structure necessary for an efficient society, where certainty, credibility, and legitimacy are key ingredients in creating a thriving environment to positively impact all economic and social sectors.

Institutions in the African context have been studied by scholars. Daren Acemoglu and James Robinson, in their book, "Why nations failed?" (2012), tackled the issues of government failures to lead their countries into economic prosperity. The authors explored some of the causes hindering development, including the differences in political institutions, historical conditions

affecting institutions, weak governments, democracy and governance, and foreign aid effectiveness around the world. They studied the evolution of prosperity and institutions based on formal and informal rules, and most importantly how societies function economically, politically, and socially. Their book provides great insights into the many reasons that affect a country's economic success and put emphasis on the political approach of extractive economies.

In a keynote video lecture on the book, Acemoglu (2015) discussed what they called the most popular view among Economists, "the ignorant leadership hypothesis" where policies drafted and implemented by leaders is important. However, the author noted that leaders are constrained by their environment and do not always have the capability and liberty to solely define their policies, which can be good or bad for their economy. According to Acemoglu and Robinson, who built on the work of Douglas North, a scholar whose work is documented in the literature review, the most important factor in the success of a country is to have "inclusive economic institutions". "The word inclusive is supposed to emphasize that good institutions are not only those that provide secure property rights and such things, but they provide them in such a way that is inclusive, that is, they are broad-based" (Acemoglu, 2015). The authors continued with the role of slavery and colonization in creating "extractive economic institutions", creating a non-level playing field for the countries which were colonized, creating inequalities, benefiting the wealthiest individuals and the wealthiest countries – "Those sort of political institutions, which concentrate economic power [in a few hands], called extractive political institutions, where there is a monopoly of political power in the hands of a few and extreme lack of constraints and checks and balances on how the power is exercised". They concluded that extractive political institutions[10] do not create sustainable economic growth because every policy is skewed to benefit the wealthiest, including contract enforcement and property rights among others; and emphasized the necessity to promote a more inclusive society where "broad-based participation, education, free entry, growth-based property rights, not just for a few but for many". Their critics claimed that their research mirrored the model of American democracy and governance structure (Dixit, 2015).

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[10] Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson used extractive economic institutions and extractive political institutions interchangeably. Those types of institutions tend to exclude most of the population from benefiting from the wealth generated in a country, creating an unequal society for the benefits of the ruling elite. This is the opposite of an inclusive economic institutions where a great majority benefits from economic activities.

In using Robinson and Acemoglu's book as a steppingstone, one cannot deny the role of political institutions and democratic models in shaping a nation's prosperity. However, is the American-style democracy the best solution? China during the Mao era was on its knees and economic indicators were in the red. After the change in leadership, Deng Xiaoping became the leader of China and his vision change the international order in terms of economic and military dominance (Lampton, 2014). This success was achieved without using the western model of democracy. What were the factors that changed the course of China in the last 40 years? How can the leadership brought by President Xiaoping, despite its democratic restrictions, serve as an inspiration to leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa to reshape the course of their nations? Furthermore, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) did not analyze the impact of presidential power in strengthening institutions toward a more inclusive society. While China's journey to exponential growth may be oppressive according to agreed standards of human rights and democracy, other countries have achieved economic growth miracles in their respective region. Acemoglu and Robinson argued sustainable economic development is possible with the right political system and inclusive institutions. The "right" political system which seems to be defined as a democracy or rule by the people is a prerequisite for sustainable growth while the opposite, dictatorship, is not. Democracy is ideal; however, it does not always mean inclusiveness.

In their article "An African Success Story: Botswana" (Acemoglu & Al., 2012), they stated that there was little research on the topic of strong institutions and comparative analysis among African countries to understand the phenomena – from pre-colonial institutions to the post-independence. The authors described Singapore as an inclusive state that is not a full-fledged democracy while Botswana is a democracy but only partially inclusive, confronting patrimonial practices where public resources are misused for private gains. Singapore gained its independence a year before Botswana, and both have parliamentary political systems. By 2019, Singapore had a GDP per capita of $65,233 compared to $7,859 for Botswana. The author argued that the difference in economic growth between the countries was due to how inclusive one country is versus the other. Because Singapore is prone to inclusiveness, the country established a system of meritocracy; hence, not relying on a system of personal relationships in public institutions. The Singapore miracle demonstrates that one size does not fit all and that Sub-Saharan African countries could be better served by finding the right formula to drive sustainable economic growth.

Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah is a scholar who has written about leadership and institutions in Africa. The author focused on the impact of corruption on public institutions and emphasized the need for strong leadership in the public sector. Yeboah-Assiamah (2016) discussed the consequences of corruption and how it negatively affects the value-added creation of societal resources and used Farazmand (2002)'s text to explain that "globalization and privatization empower corporate elites, and by providing various opportunities for corruption, lubricate their wheels of domination and exploitation of indigenous national economies and human and natural resources". He went further in his analysis by developing a corruption control tripod which has three pillars: 1) strong personalities "which requires public officials to develop their personal ethics and integrity", 2) strong organizations "which requires individual public organizations and the state to design peculiar systems that is context-dependent to propel, promote ethical conduct and integrity, to monitor, prevent and control corruption." and, 3) an civil society organizations composed of the media, think tanks, opposition parties, non-governmental organizations "that compels officials to churn out virtues". The work done by Yeboah-Assiamah is very valuable in understanding the role of leadership in building strong institutions and how corruption weakens institutions; however, his research does not analyze the historical impact of presidential leadership on public institutions.

The recent work of Ignacio Arana Araya (2020) discussed "The Personalities of Presidents as Independent Variables", the author highlighted the growing field in understanding the personalities of presidents and provided examples of presidents who had their personality traits analyzed by psychologists – leaders such as Adolph Hitler, Saddam Hussein Hugo Chavez as well as many others. According to Araya, presidents occupy the highest office of the land, as such they "are the most powerful politicians in presidential systems and their decisions have enormous consequences" (Arana, 2020). The scholar also argued that certain traits could have a positive impact on the success of the presidency. For Arana, science "should embrace the theories and methods that differential psychology offers to test hypotheses using personality traits of presidents as independent variables". In his research, the scholar utilized data available for over 300 presidents, during a period of 67 years (1945-2012) in the western hemisphere, to understand how the personality traits of a president influence his decision-making process. The arguments made by Arana support the subject of this research as it aims to demonstrate the relationship between

the influence of presidents on the quality of selected public institutions. His work focused on Latin America and did not study the geographic area targeted by this research.

In building on the existing literature on the subject matter, my research conducts a comparative study on the role of presidential leadership in strengthening public institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, more specifically on how the leadership traits influence the quality of targeted institutions. Presidents have the responsibility to develop policies, enact laws and implement programs in key public sectors. As such, studying their impact on institutions they oversaw is relevant, particularly in the African context.

b. The Theoretical Specification

Presidential leadership is at the heart of the research. Presidents are agents to their population, actors who are to make rational choices for the good of their citizens. They are trusted with public resources raised from various income sources generated by their principals, who in turn expect public value across an array of services needed but not always provided by the private sector. Given the above statement, the Principle-Agent Theory is a natural theoretical framework to apply in this research. According to Baiman (1982), the definition of the Agency Theory is as follows: "one person or entity (the "agent"), can make decisions and/or take actions on behalf of, or that impact, another person or entity: the "principal" (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Presidents, when they take the highest office of the land, vow to improve the lives of their population and to be fiscally responsible. The relationship between the principal and the agent is tainted with asymmetric information which should be normally minimized. Meanwhile, the agent evolves within a structure of formal and informal rules, many historical and some recent, that are not easy to change given the established norms, cultures, and types of institutions. Structures come with rules and may impede the ability of a president to implement his vision to the fullest. As such, the principle-agent theory might not be sufficient in understanding the role of presidential leadership in strengthening public institutions. As quoted by Alonso & al (2020), "Agents create the structure that provides the motivation to act in accordance with the behavior predicted by institutions, thereby perpetuating their structure. In this vision, it is important to consider not only the incentives promoted by institutions but also the reasons why agents operate according to that

framework: that is, the credibility and legitimacy of institutions are also important factors of institutional quality".

Given the role of agents in the creation of structure, I also considered the Theory of Structuration of Antony Giddens (1984) with the reasoning that a president is an individual, despite being elected or a defector leader, who must operate within a system – a system, which if not navigated masterfully, may affect his ability to perform efficiently his agency role. According to Giddens, "understanding people's activities is the central purpose of social analysis"; therefore, to comprehend an activity, "one must understand institutional embeddedness". The author argued that each one of us is an active participant in a system whether it is in a social, political, or economic area. Individuals are part of the system and help shape how the system functions. In their book, The Actor and the System[11], Crozier, and Frieberg (1977) defined an organization as "the realm of power, influence, bargaining, and calculation". The nuances imply that organized society is governed by power and influence which are used to create societal norms and structures where an actor evolves. In a system, actors can either be principles or agents, depending on their positions and activities within society.

The Structuration Theory may establish how presidential leaders use their power and influence to set the rules of the game within their countries. For instance, from the day of independence from Great Britain onward, President Seretse Khama and Botswana's political leadership drafted a constitution[12] that established a governance structure based on pre-colonial institutions; thus, ensuring accountability and larger political participation. By establishing the foundation of their ideal societal structure, political leaders in Botswana established policies such as the "Tribal Grazing land Policy Act" which divided the land into three categories (Communal, Commercial, and Reserve) laying the ground for an export industry of beef and later diamonds once those natural resources were exploited (Hillbom, 2014). By establishing a structure that was deemed inclusive at the time, as it incorporated existing social norms, President Khama created the foundation that makes his country a success story of economic development and good governance in Sub-Saharan Africa despite the inequality that continues to exist. Indeed, according to Crozier and Frieberg (1977), "The organization itself only exists through the partial objectives

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[11] Original french title : "*L'acteur et le système*", Edition du Seuil, 1977
[12] Botswana's 1966 constitution

and rationalities of the individuals or groups within it[13]". As such, an individual, agent, or principal, can influence the structure of the system.

The complementarity between agency and structure is supported by Taylor's Scientific Management and Weber's theory of bureaucracy where organizations appear as closed systems and where structures determine the action of the individuals (Jochoms T., Rutgers, M., 2005). Their theory helped in understanding the work of the public sector – a president leads the executive branch of the government and works within an existing structure of institutions that were defined before he took office; as such as an agent, a president must navigate existing systems to elaborate and execute its policy as per the vision he sold to his population.

When Nelson Mandela became the president of South Africa in 1994, he was confronted with the apartheid system that was created to discriminate against people of color: "The public service inherited by the new South African government in 1994 was designed to promote and defend the social and economic system of apartheid and was geared to serving the material needs and interests of the minority. Structured along with mechanical, closed models of public and development administration, the principal features of the apartheid bureaucracy included rigid racial and ethnic segregation, a serious lack of representativity, fragmentation and duplication, corruption and mismanagement of resources, poor and outdated management practices, a regulatory bureaucratic culture, lack of accountability and transparency, poorly paid and demotivated staff and conflictual labor relations" (Bardill, 2000). To deconstruct the existing system, the government issued a White Paper on the Transformation of Public Services in 1995 as a necessary step to move forward Mandela's reconstruction agenda. As an actor in the system, Mandela could not change overnight the structural foundation of public Services in South Africa; however, under his leadership, the executive branch took the necessary step to restructure the existing system to create more inclusive institutions. While the work is still ongoing, the acknowledgment of the existing structure was a step toward a more inclusive public administration.

Table 1, below from Jochoms and Rutgers' article (2005), summarizes the concept of complementary of the Agency Theory and the Theory of Structuration faced by President Mandela.

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[13] Original french text : "L'organisation elle-même n'existe qu'à travers les objectifs et rationalités partiels des individus ou groupes en son sein".

It also illustrates the reality faced by any presidents when they take function. The complementary between the two theories will be used throughout this research.

Table 1: The Complementarity between Agency and Structure

EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITIONS IN THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

		METHODOLOGY	
		Objectivism/Explanation	Subjectivism/Understanding
ONTOLOGY	Structure (Holism)	Systems Structural Functionalism	Language games New institutionalism
	Agency (individualism)	Agents Public & rational choice	Actor Culture Theory

Source: Jochoms and Rutger (2005)

c. Definition of Key Concepts

Before the research question and as part of the literature review, it is important to define the key concepts to facilitate the understanding of the process I used to define presidential power, leadership, and institutions. The objective of the following section is to structure the research for the reader to understand the parameters of the work.

i. What is Presidential Power?

- <u>Defining presidential leadership – from the dictionary to the scholars</u>

The first question I had to address is why I was talking about presidential leadership because a president is assumed to be a leader given his role in his country. As replicated around the world, most nations are led by heads of state who speak on behalf of their populations and make decisions based on the constitution, laws, and informal rules within their countries. It is then an assumption or a standard knowledge that "president" = "leader" and "president" = "power". As such, it became important to go beyond the common knowledge and interpretation to center this research around the advantages and limitations of presidential power in the African context.

Academic research on leadership has always been a topic of interest because of the way society is structured. Because of his role in ruling a country, a president is a de-facto leader of the nation he represents. Leadership is given to an individual because of the societal system in which people live, where individuals need to live in a group setting to thrive and survive. In 1921, Freud

argued that people tend to place themselves under authoritative ruling: "[A group] has such a thirst of obedience it submits himself instinctively to anyone who appoints its master" (Goethals, 2005). For a leader to exist, presidential or not, it is important that the group believes in his leadership capability and his power to influence policies and resource allocation. In "Following the leader ruling – Ruling China from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping", Lampton (2014) defined leaders as "those persons in the public, private and social organization sectors who exert significant influence over diverse realms of policy and public discourse".

In the political arena, how leaders are viewed and appreciated is often defined in the country's constitution; however, the position does not necessarily come with legitimacy. Monod (2012) explored political leadership in his book "What is a leader in democracy?[14]" and reviewed the history of research around leadership. He highlighted the view of a few scholars and philosophers, including Aristotle whose political view on the role of leaders is summarized as follows: "When an individual, or some, or many, govern in the common interest, the constitution is necessarily right; when they govern in their interest, whether in the interest of one, of some or the crowd, the constitution is derived from its purpose".

Leadership in the public sector is also defined as the role of public leaders/managers to "execute governmental rules and regulations (Hill and Hupe 2009), account for the actions of external stakeholders, including politicians and the media (Bovens, 2007), show political loyalty, even if this incurs personal costs (Gailmard & Patty, 2012), and operate in networks" (Klijn & Koppenjan 2012). The above definitions suggest that when one becomes the president of a country, regardless of the geographic location, the person is seen as a leader. According to Goethals (2005), "the president is a symbolic leader, who draws together the people's hopes and fears". A president is expected to lead his population and is the ultimate authority figure in a country. Instinctively, once a president takes office, it can be assumed that his population looks upon him to provide the leadership necessary to better their lives by utilizing public goods and services to develop and execute sound policies in all socio-economic sectors in the nation. A president will always be equal to a leader, regardless of his ability to lead effectively or not, positively, or not. This brief introduction to the work on leadership is important to move forward as presidential leadership and

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[14] Original title : "Qu'est-ce qu'un chef en démocratie"

presidential power can be used interchangeably given the different meanings in the academic literature.

In the dictionary, a president is the highest officer of a modern republic or state, appointed or elected, to preside over an organized body of persons[15]. According to www.thesaurus.com, "president" is a synonym of leader, head of state, commander in chief, chief executing officer, boss, or person in charge. As defined, the president is the ultimate decision-maker of a given population. This is further supported by the following characteristics attributed to a president – guiding, ruling, controlling, directing, dominating, ordering, overseeing, authoritative, influential, and mastering. The position of the presidency comes with a set of power, allowing him to make decisions aimed to improve, develop, and grow an institution or a country.

According to Meriam-Webster, power is defined as a) the ability to act or produce an effect; b) the legal or official authority; c) possession of control, authority, capacity, or right; or d) political control or influence. Given the definition of power, a president can automatically be defined as a person of power. Commonalities between the definitions of president and power are influence, control, and authority. It may seem redundant to use "president" and "power" in the same sentence because people always assume that the person elected or selected to be president has the power, the authority, and the capacity to reign and change the course of their country's direction and history.

In addition to the leadership that comes with the presidency, presidential power around the world is determined by a set of rules which gives the authority to a president to make decisions as given by the constitution and laws in his country. At the top of each country, a head of state, elected whether thru universal votes or natural selection, is bestowed presidential power, which serves as the cornerstone for building, establishing, and implementing a governance framework for public institutions to create an environment favorable for the improvement of human development, which in turn will improve the private sector's ability to compete on the world stage. Indeed, Presidents have the power to allocate resources necessary for public institutions to thrive. Through his team, a president can draft and/or propose laws, which once passed thru parliament or congress, are

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[15] Definition from www.dictonary.com

signed by the president for their implementation and applicability by the executive and legislative branches of the government.

In their article titled "Who controls bureaucracy", Hammond and Knott (1996) stated that presidents can control bureaucracy because they control appointments of their cabinet, define policies and control budget allocations based on established priorities. The authors also noted the congressional constraints which may curb some of the presidential decisions. These do not take away the presidential power given that constitutions provide some flexibility to a president to execute his mandate. Presidential power provides administrative tools to a head of state to draft and execute his policies throughout his term(s).

ii.   Presidential Power in the African context

The academic research on presidential power is limited in the African context. However, this did not constitute a limitation as presidential power has been extensively analyzed and written in the context of the United States of America by scholars who have worked in academia and have served different administrations. The democratic process in the USA is also in my view a good example of democracy, where, despite all its flaws, there is a distinct separation between the three branches of the government, including the legal framework around the power attributed to a President. There is extensive literature on the performance of each American president, with a historical review of the decision made, within the context of the time in which the presidency took place. American presidents are ranked based on their performance in the socio-politic and economic stability as well as their handling of major domestic and international crises. While I will not dwell on reviewing the American presidency since it is not the context of my research, the existing literature is pertinent in the theoretical framework, including understanding how presidential power and/or leadership has been documented by scholars.

Traditionally, Africa was defined by the concentration of ethnic groups. Michalopoulous and Papaioannou (2013) explained the complexity of the political system in Africa and the impact of having a group with centralized authority, including the administrative and judicial apparel to support economic growth and stability within the region versus a group without a centralized authoritative figure, often leading to political instability in the region. The two presented the "jurisdictional hierarchy beyond the local community level" map of Murdock (1967) to further

explain Africa's past political structures, which might still be of influence today as people associate themselves with a tribe and/or a country. Before colonization, there were no heads of state but kings and chiefs who served as authoritative figures in their communities. While the influence of local chiefs remains strong, especially outside of the capital, colonization had an impact on Africa's politics, by imposing artificial borders which divided communities and by creating the modern institutions led by heads of state.

In Africa, presidential leadership is often seen as a one-man show. In their paper "Endogenous presidentialism", Robinson & Torvick (2016), highlighted De Luisgnan's arguments (1969) that "the concentration of all government responsibility in the hands of one man was in the spirit of African tribal tradition". This is further consolidated in most constitutions in sub-Saharan Africa where the powers bestowed upon a president are broadly defined in the country's constitution. In the Rwandan Constitution of 2003, amended in 2015, the president is designed as the head of the state, the defender of the constitution, and the guarantor of national unity. He ensures the continuity of the state, independence and sovereignty of the country, and respect for international treaties. Furthermore, the president has the power to: a) promulgate laws, b) call a referendum on issues of national interest, c) declare war, state of siege, and state of emergencies, d) issue currency, and e) enact presidential orders. Like Rwanda, most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have a presidential constitution, except for a few such as Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa; hence bestowing the same power to heads of state in presidential regimes.

In summary, a president is recognized as a leader given the de-facto power enshrined in his country's constitution. Because of their positions, they represent their nation on the world stage, the heads of arms forces in their countries, responsible for national security, and for their perceived influence in guiding their economies thru prosperity[16]. In addition to the leadership role received upon taking office, presidents are bestowed administrative power – defined as the ability to allocate resources to support established priority by the executive branch – which they use to implement their policies and to strengthen the public institutions they oversee during their terms.

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[16] Commonalities from most constitutions

iii.   Presentation of the Nieburg Value Continuum – Paradigm of Leadership

This section introduces the Nieburg Value Continuum Paradigm of Leadership and explains how leadership traits of presidents or heads of state are classified following Nieburg's Continuum.

In his article "the Paradigms of Presidential Power" (1991), Nieburg highlighted the hypothetical continuum of the power bestowed to a president – from Pure Authority to Pure Service, where the perception of presidential effectiveness can be measured, especially the impact of those decisions over time. The author used the work of five scholars – Richard Neustadt, Thomas Cronin, Max Weber, James David Barber, and James MacGregor Burns – to provide a scale for understanding the impact and complexity of presidential leadership and power (Fig. 2).

From one end of the spectrum, led by Neustadt, who argued about the absolute authority given or taken by a president in his functions, with the power to unilaterally make decisions without the need for consensus from his population "At the Authority pole, theorists of power posit the ability of a leader to express and implement a unique vision of the future" (Nieburg, 1991). The use for force, sanctions, and coercion are used in the process. Immediately, without further academic research and with available gray literature, the assumption can be made that, at a minimum, a handful of African presidents, have used excessively the power bestowed upon them. Idi Amin, during his tenure in Uganda, overused his power to expulse 50,000 Asians and to launch a "voluntary" cleaning campaign of the streets of Uganda, forcing the United States to take economic sanctions against Uganda to weaken his power (Ullman, 1978). On the other end of the spectrum, as presented by Nieburg in 1991, supported by Burns and other scholars, a president makes decisions based on the mutual interests of his population and where the president is seen as a moral authority who leads by example – "At the Service pole, the will of the leader, to be legitimate to his followers, must express a mutuality of interests, and maybe arrived at by a process, formal or informal, of consultation and consensus-building". For sure, we cannot talk about purity and perfection because it does not exist; however, it is undeniable that one can strive for such achievement. In looking at the performance of Obama's presidency, the Affordable Care Act legislation provided health insurance to over 20 million (Klein, 2017). Was it perfect? No, however, it was a step in the right direction, especially for his followers who felt heard, securing him a second term.

Regardless of the pole of authority, any decision-making process must rely on the ability to maneuver within a political system where the president is the leader and his populations are followers and where "every act of leadership, formal or informal, is controlled by the organic of the collectivity" (Nieburg, 1991). The president is an actor of the system, and it is in that system that he has the latitude, within the realm of the formal and informal laws, to use the power bestowed on him to make decisions that impact the socio-economic growth as well as the political environment of his country. In a corrupt environment, actors use their power on others to create a system of bribery, such as the problem of zombie teachers cited above (Managerial Issue, p. 10-13) as reported by the Government of Niger. This example makes an observer wonder about the effectiveness of the presidential power in establishing governance systems to minimize corruption in his country.

In using the Nieburg spectrum, a breakdown of the scholarly work is important to understand how presidential power has been studied in the academic field by five leading scholars (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Presentation of Nieburg Value Continuum Paradigms of Leadership

THE VALUE CONTINUUM

Paradigms of Leadership

	Crisis Conditions	→ ←	Normal Conditions	
	Neustadt Cronin		Weber	Barber Burns

Pure Authority ←———————————————————————→ Pure Service

Polarities

Stick	Carrot
Unitlateral Will	Mutuality
Negative reinforcement	Positive reinforcement
Coercion / use of force	Creative opportunities
Power of threats	Power of example
Emphasis on formal policy	Emphasis on informal example
Technical authority	Moral authority
Manipulation	Inspiration
Direct sanctions	Indirect sanctions
Elitist Theory of Politics	Organic theory of politics

Source: Nieburg (1991)

The first paradigm of leadership presented in Nieburg's Value Continuum is from Richard Neustadt in his book Presidential Power (1960), written based on his practical experience as a public servant working in different administrations, summarized presidential power as "the power to persuade". For Neustadt, in the American context, the president must use resources at his disposal to influence the different groups and interests to move forward his agenda and shape the institutions based on his visions – "With a strong and courageous president at the top, willing to apply all the resources of the office, the system could succeed brilliantly" (Nieburg, 1991). Because the president is an actor in the system, he must navigate with ability and wisdom within that system to shape the political and social system the way it envisioned it. According to Neustadt, power is managed at the personal level and despite having formal authority, being in a position of power does not necessarily guarantee that the person in charge can exercise his power if he cannot influence – "It is not the role of the president but the performance of those roles (people within institutions) that matter. It is not the boundaries of behavior but the actions within those boundaries" (Neustadt, 1960).

In the *Actor and the system*, Crozier and Friedberg (1977), highlighted the power struggle between different groups of employees within an organization and how interconnected and complementary each group was, even if the level of influence might differ. According to the authors, an organization "is a kingdom of power relations, influence, bargaining and calculation[17]" (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). The influence of a person in a leadership position is merely based on the way he addresses the crowd but more on the actions he takes to make change happen or to move the needle even if it is one-tenth of an inch "to make commands effective (i.e. to enhance authority and legitimacy, and preserve his future power), the incumbent needs to do much more than utter the words" (Nieburg, 1991).

In looking at the continuum elaborated by Nieburg, Richard Neustadt, a known scholar on the subject of presidential power, is at the beginning of the spectrum, argued that presidential power is a unilateral will, where a president can use a stick, power of threats, manipulations, direct sanctions, and the use of the elitist theory of politics, where politics and decision-making centers maneuver within the realm of politics, to influence others. The unilateral will resonates in this

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[17] Original text : « une organisation "est un royaume des relations de pouvoir, de l'influence, du marchandage et du calcul »

statement made by Paul Kagame in the July 2019 issue of Time magazine[18]: "I have fought for the freedom of my people better than these supervisors who come and say, 'Well, you are doing this. You know, don't do this.' No! I know what I am doing. I know what is good for me. I don't need to be told by anybody." Does this mean that the way Kagame has been using his presidential power in Rwanda has strengthened public institutions given that the country is touted as an example to follow 20 years after the genocide? Over time, Neustadt changed his stand on leadership and acknowledged presidents "must lead by persuasion" (Hargrove, 2001), closing a gap with Cronin on the issue of the essence of presidential leadership.

Thomas Cronin, the author of *The State of the Presidency*, was not very far from Neustadt's view on presidential power. In his article, "Thinking about leadership", Cronin (1984) noted that "leaders have to be almost single-minded in their drive and commitment but much of that makes a person rigid, driven and unacceptable". For Cronin, pure authority does not work, a leader needs to show some understanding and flexibility because his followers might not know what they need, so it is for the president to provide the solutions to improving life that people will realize they need. A president can help shift the needs of his constituents with good communication because ultimately, he cannot exist without his followers; a stick approach might not always work. Beyond the power of communication, Cronin, like Neustadt, believed that a president can only be effective "unless he or she can recruit managers to help them make things work over the long run" (Cronin, 1984). This statement speaks about the administrative power of a president to put resources, human and financial, into implementing sound policies to not only improve public institutions but also create an environment for economic growth where the internal and external private sector is willing to invest in the country. In addition, a president must build alliances to use and affirm his power.

In the center of the value continuum is Max Weber who contributed greatly to political theory and leadership, particularly on the charisma, a divine power, that a leader must have to succeed. For Weber, someone in a leadership position has power, defined as "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (Uphoff, 1989). A modern-day president is for the most part selected by his population, putting him in a position of power – with

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[18] https://time.com/5615631/rwandan-genocide-president-interview/

power comes legitimacy. However, for Weber, being in a position of power does not necessarily mean legitimacy and when a leader does not have legitimacy, he will not be able to accomplish the objectives he has set for himself and the group. Weber defined legitimacy as "a conviction on the part of persons subject to authority that it is right and proper and that they have some obligation to obey, regardless of the basis on which this belief rests." (Uphoff, 1989). Sub-Saharan Africa has been known for political instability since independence, creating continuous setbacks in economic growth. In following Weber's view, the lack of legitimacy may be the reason behind the political instability in the region. With some presidencies spanning over several decades, presidents may not have the incentives to better the lives of their populations but they prioritize their personal gain, as demonstrated by the self-proclamation of President Idriss Deby as Marshal.

From my perspective, in an ideal world, a leader should be inspiring and lead by example. A few come to mind, including Nelson Mandela, whose journey to a more equitable society is inspiring. However, like everyone else those inspirational presidents have flaws, and that purity does not exist in exercising power at the highest office of any country. To understand "pure service", it is essential to interpret the two scholars, James David Barber and James MacGregor Burns, who are closer to this spectrum of the value continuum. Both believed that presidential power should have the following dimensions – mutuality, positive reinforcement, creative opportunities, power of example, moral authority, inspiration, and indirect sanctions, among others. These facets of presidential power can be linked to their leadership style of governing.

At the onset, Barbers was closer to Neustadt in his view of presidential power, (both having served the same administration) (Edwards, 1974). Barber's take on presidential power changed over time, focusing on understanding the morality of the presidency – "There is a strong deterministic mixture in his belief that presidential personalities are almost fully-formed in the childhood years, and that successful performance depends on leaders having the right kind of personalities to fit the needs of the time" (Nieburg, 1991). As such, a leader's personality is important to predict the way he exercises his power. Barber's work in the American administration as his model was "successful" to partly predict the outcome of the Nixon presidency. While his model is not perfect, it is undeniable that personality traits matter, especially for a powerful person: "Barber skillfully differentiated a variety of motivational patterns that led a diverse group of individuals to enter the Connecticut state legislature. He identified four types of legislators-

"Lawmaker," "Spectator," "Advertiser," and "Reluctant" and offered insightful speculative analyses of how the distinctive personality configurations associated with each type affected their orientation to and activity in the role of the legislator" (George, 1974).

At the end of the value continuum in the Paradigms of Leadership is James MacGregor Burns who wrote extensively about transformational leadership. For Burns (1978) to "understand the nature of leadership requires an understanding of the essence of power, for leadership is a special form of power". In line with Pure Service, the scholar believed that a person in a position of leadership can motivate his followers to be the leaders they want to be, ultimately becoming leaders in their rights to inspire others to follow by example. In this type of leadership, values are very important, and presidents are viewed as moral authorities for their nations and a source of motivation to achieve common objectives. Burns focused on the value of leadership over the style of leadership which "begins on people's terms, driven by their needs, and must culminate in expanding opportunities for happiness. What matters is the ability of political leaders to unlock the potential of their people" (Burns, 2003). Transformational leadership seems ideal in any situation; however, it may not be practical because leaders, like any individuals, are imperfect as such a president uses his power to the best of his ability to move forward with his agenda.

In summary, Nieburg Value Continuum offers a global picture of the five scholars who have tackled the subject of leadership. Most had a practical experience in working with modern-day American presidents, witnessing firsthand how presidential power is used, based on the style, personality, and value of the president. The use of a stick or a carrot depends on the conditions a president faces in his time in office. In analyzing the Value Continuum (Figure 2), in real life, purity is difficult to use in a democracy, the use of one can not only differ on the style but also on the condition in which presidential power is exercised. For this research, the Nieburg Value Continuum Paradigm of Leadership is used to classify the leadership traits of presidents, from Pure Authority to Pure Service. In other words, presidents or heads of state will be classified based on the work of the five Scholars introduced above and as summarized by the Nieburg Value Continuum.

iv.   How are Public Institutions Defined in the Research?

To contextualize the research, it is important to define "Public Institutions" in the realm of the research and based on existing literature. A president is a public figure, whose role is to improve the lives of his citizens. In doing so, he is given the responsibility to oversee public institutions; as such, a literature review was essential to define public institutions in this research.

- **The Parameters of Public Institutions**

As the head of state, the president of any country has the responsibility to oversee the effectiveness of bureaucracy in public institutions, including providing the resources to achieve their mandate and applying the legal framework to ensure an environment enabling growth driven by the private sector. But why do public institutions matter?

This section starts with an introductory context for institutions, followed by a literature review to define institutions as per the School of Institutional Economics, including what are considered public institutions. Next, it discusses why public institutions are essential to economic growth and the market economy. The section concludes with the definition of "public institutions" to be used in this research.

With humanity comes social orders; hence the need to build organizations and institutions responding the societal demands and fostering a functioning society without infringing on individual needs. For society to function properly, rules and structures are essential to not only constrain how individuals behave but also to empower the behaviors of those same beings. In 2006, Hodgson defined institutions "as systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions. Language, money, law, systems of weights and measures, table manners, and firms (and other organizations) are thus all institutions". Those social rules are meant to "regulate" how individuals interact with each other as part of the existing social structure.

Individuals have always been at the center of economics. In the classic liberalism economics, with Economists such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mills, John Locke, and Steven Lukes, "individuals were seen as abstracts with given interest, wants, purposes and needs, etc." (Hodgson, 2006). In that era, the focus was on the free market, productivity, and specialization, which meant that individuals "could be taken for granted". However, in their analysis, Economists like Adam Smith, who dealt with economic development from a historical stance, concluded that a free-market economy cannot self-regulate itself without proper public institutions. Smith viewed

the "State as a collective coercive agency" and "called attention to the nature of the institutional environment, including political rules, property rights, and contracts, all of which are enforced by the state" (Kim, 2014).

These assumptions were further developed by Douglass North. His research focused on the role of the public sector to ensure economic performance, low transaction costs, and trade specialization. Douglass North (1990) defined "institutions as the rules of games in society or, more formally, are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, etc. The purpose of the rule is to define the way the game is played". Rules, legal or not, are essential in the functioning of any society and require incentives and/or disincentives to be followed – "For laws to become rules, they have to be enforced to the point that the avoidance or performance of the behavior in question becomes customary and acquires a normative status" (Hodgson, 2006). This goes back to the theory of Adam Smith in the Wealth of Nations (1776), where he stated that an economy cannot grow without the active role of the state in enforcing contracting agreements and property rights through a system of justice that seems fair to everyone. "Hence, under a secure rule of government enforced laws, economic agents attempt to save more, make more efficient use of resources, engage in more production and exchange and improve productivity" (Kim, 2014). As per the work of Kim (2014) in comparing the work of Adam Smith and Douglas North on economic development, institutions exist to constrain interactions among human beings thru a set of rules, which ultimately, according to Adam Smith (1776) would promote efficiency, productivity, and growth or to reduce transaction costs (North, 1992) The later argued that "the key to improving economic performance is the deliberate effort of human beings to control their environment, and the establishment of efficient institutions by lowering transaction costs (increasing property rights) reduces the uncertainty arising from impersonal exchange" (Snowdon, 2016). For both economists, political and legal institutions are critical in promoting economic growth because of the necessity to secure property rights and enforce contracts.

Institutional economics continued to be developed further by the likes of Veblen. As one of the leading figures of the Old Institutional Economics (OIE), Thorstein Veblen associated institutions with rules and behaviors. According to Hodgson (2006), an economist from the Veblenian school argued that "institutions work only because the rules involved are embedded in shared habits of thought and behavior". Individuals are born within a system in which they must adapt from very early on, "forcing" them in a way to develop their habits within a culture of

established rules, sometimes written, sometimes legal but most universally acceptable social norms in their environment. Unlike liberalism economics, Veblen emphasized the cognitive function of institutions and argued that institutions are affected by human behaviors – "Human beings do not live in a world of raw fact; they live in an interpreted world, a world in which objects, actions, and relationships have meanings. Therefore, a scientific explanation involving humans must take those meanings into account, since they are necessarily part of the 'facts' available" (Langlois, 1989).

Individual cognitive functions are influenced by their history and culture, driving the way they comply with social structures and rules "Institution rules do more that give content to beliefs, they structure the processes by which the particular substantive content is established…. Understanding the genesis of social institutions and culture is important not only for understanding incentive structures but also…for understanding processes of cognition and rationality" (Dequech, 2002). Indeed, while the management of formal institutions is the central role of the government, one can't overlook the influence of informal institutions in the former's ecosystem as they help shape a country's culture, including customs, traditions, and acceptable codes of conduct (Figure 3). While culture shapes the nature of institutions, it is not the focus of this research and is only used for the purpose to understand the definition of institutions.

Figure 3: What is a Public Institution?

Source: Own elaboration - Summary of literature review on defining public institutions

Learning from the institutional economists, we can assume the critical need for public institutions to help regulate the free markets economy and to spur economic growth. However, their definitions also emphasize the need for social orders, as per existing customs, which are essential for the overall well-being of the population. The private sector cannot thrive without public investments in key social sectors such as health, education, food, physical security, and infrastructure.

While informal social institutions cannot be overlooked, the main conclusion is that rules are necessary for a functioning society. A government's main purpose is to propose and legalize those rules as per the process defined in its constitution, and to be the gatekeeper and enforcers of those rules. Going back to the Adam Smith era and continuing with Douglass North, public institutions can be defined in terms of property rights, contract enforcement, and rule of law. This is how public institutions will be defined in this research; particularly in understanding how presidents in Sub-Saharan Africa have supported the strengthening of those public institutions to create conditions for economic growth.

d. Summary of the Literature Review

The literature review began with the existing work of scholars, primarily Acemoglu and Al. (2012) whose research focused on the reasons why governments failed at leading their countries to prosperity – from the differences in historical conditions affecting institutions to foreign aid effectiveness around the world; Yebeah-Assiamah (2016) who explored how corruption impacts value creation and developed a tripod to link strong personalities, strong organizations, and an active civil society as a way to understand the role of leadership in building strong institutions and how corruption weakens them; and Ignacio Arana Araya (2020) who argued that personalities of presidents matter because their decisions could have major consequences on the quality of public institutions. The work of the scholars highlights the contribution of this research – to increase the academic body of knowledge on the relationship between leadership traits and the quality of public institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa. While comparative analysis among countries exists, the research on presidential power provides additional academic knowledge on the influence of presidential power on public institutions in Africa.

The literature review provides argumentations of the theoretical framework selected – the complementarity between the Agency Theory (Jensen and Mackling, 1976) where presidents are agents for their population, and the Structuration Theory (Giddens,1984) to demonstrate the limitation of presidential power as a result of existing structures, legal and informal. The agent (president) must navigate within existing systems to influence the bureaucratic effectiveness of public institutions he oversees during his term in office. I then presented the definition of key concepts that were essential to frame my research. These concepts included the definition of presidential power – from the dictionary to scholars, and of public institutions by presenting the work of scholars from the School of Institutional Economics. This exercise led to the presentation of Nieburg Value Continuum - Paradigm of Leadership, from pure authority to pure service, and its use in the research to classify president leadership traits in the regression analysis.

III. RESEARCH QUESTION

This research aims to understand the power of presidential leadership in strengthening public institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa given the executive power bestowed on presidents by the constitutions of their countries. More specifically, the objective is to understand if presidents have used their influence to improve the public institutions of their country. For this research, institutions are defined as Judicial Independence, Protection of Property Rights, and Legal Enforcement of Contracts. The analysis covers 48 years, 1970-2018, and analyzes the influence of authoritative and non-authoritative leadership traits on the quality of public institutions.

a. Research Design

The research uses regression analysis to understand the relationship between the quality of the dependent variable, Public Institution or $Public_{inst}$ and independent variables, of which the leadership traits of the head of state, $Lead_{service}$, is the main independent variable. A step-by-step method is used to add explanatory independent variables into the equation. These additional variables are a proxy of the system constraints under which a president or head of state must operate; hence curtailing the influence of the executive on the quality of the public institutions as defined in the realm of this research. For the dependent variables, the regression will be run with each of the three characteristics of a public institution as defined in this research.

b. Research Question

By the end of the analysis, the objective is to answer the following research question:

Can presidents in Sub-Saharan Africa use their executive power to strengthen public institutions as defined in the context of the research?

To respond to the research question, the hypothesis put forth is:

H0: The quality of public institutions is not influenced by the leadership style of the Head of State.

H1: The quality of public institutions is influenced by the leadership style of Heads of State

The hypothesis is driven by the fact that institutions will exist regardless of the type of leadership style as defined by Nieburg Value Continuum; however, the assumption is that the quality of public institutions is correlated to the use of presidential power (the paradigm of leadership, influenced by values and customs, can strengthen or weaken public institutions).

IV.   METHODOLOGY AND DATA

This section presents the methodology and data. The section begins with the selection of the sample countries and included an introduction of the countries and a visual overview of the evolution of targeted institutions over time. The second part introduces the methodology used in the research followed by data selection from secondary sources. The section closes with the limitation of the analysis.

a. Sample size selection

i.   Sample size selection of six countries

Sub-Saharan Africa is the geographic focus of the research. According to the United Nations, there are 54 countries in Africa. Because the research focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa, the number of countries within the targeted geographic area is 50 (N=50) (excluding countries from Northern Africa – Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia), and the starting population size to be considered during the country selection process. As part of the sample selection process, the following criteria were considered:

1. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita growth from 1960 to 2019 – to understand how the standards of living have evolved during the period. This does not consider the limitation the GDP may provide as it does not address income inequalities.

2. Presidential regime – to understand the prerogatives given to presidents, the independence of the three branches of the government, and the oversight given by the Parliament and/or Senate.

3. Regional comparatively by including at least two countries in the same region, more specifically East, West, South, or Central African.

The above criteria were only utilized in selecting sample countries.

When I first decided on conducting a comparative analysis, I had biases based on my knowledge from reading gray literature on countries that seemed to be booming, such as Rwanda, versus other countries, such as the Central African Republic, that have been on the decline due to the ravage of war. Such selection would have been more preferential than logical in scientific research. I then proceeded with a more rational selection process which was to divide Sub-Saharan Africa by region. The first criteria, GDP per capita growth spanning over almost 60 years, became the principal factor of selection. The second selection criteria were the diversity of presidential

regimes as they have an impact on presidential power, based on the prerogative and independence given to the three branches of a government – the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches, as per the constitution of each country.

The GDP growth might not necessarily translate into stronger public institutions; however, it remains a measure of grading a president's impact on the economy. Modern-day presidential candidates, and those who are in office, tend to run on policy agenda that claims that the application of their policies will improve the economy and better the lives of their citizens, including improving bureaucratic efficiency, resource allocation, and reinforcement of the rule of law among others. The data of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per Capita readily available was from 1960, falling within the timeframe when most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa gained their independence. Unfortunately, some countries did not have data available from the 1960s. The GDP per capita was consistently available from 1990, with a few exceptions – Eritrea (data available from 1991-2011), Liberia (2000-2019), Mozambique (1991-2019), Somalia (1960-1990), Sao Tome (2001-2019), and South Soudan (2008-2015). Because of the incompleteness of the data available, these countries were not considered in the sample size.

The population was reduced to 44 (N=44) countries with data available in 1960. I analyzed the GDP growth trend from 1960 to 2019 and from 1990 to 2019. The result of the analysis demonstrated higher average growth in 59 years. Based on the data, the economy in Sub-Saharan Africa averaged 18.49% per year from 1960-2019 compared to an average of 4.62% growth per year from 1960 - 2019. As such, the countries which seem to have exponential growth over almost 60 years were suddenly not as attractive. For instance, Botswana multiplied its GDP per capita by 131 from 1960 to 2019 but only by 2.70 for the 1990-2019 period. Countries with single-digit growth from 1960-2019 maintained a constant from 1990-2019 such as Senegal which multiplied its per capita income by 4.62 in 59 years versus 1.50 in 29 years. According to the World Bank Data, the average per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa grew by 1,104% from 1960 to 2019 compared to 134% from 1990-to 2019. The 30 years difference had an impact on the GDP per capita growth, which may be attributed to the last two recessions, one of which spanned over two years while the last one was the worst on records according to Economists.

While another analysis is required to understand the underlying causes, a look at the world GDP per capita confirmed the downward trend during the period. The world economy grew by

25 folds from 1960 to 2019 and only by 3 folds from 1990 to 2019. The countries that colonized Sub-Saharan Africa went thru the same trend, with Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, and the United Kingdom multiplying their GDP per capita by 36, 30, 75, 64, and 30 respectively from the 1960-2019 period versus the 1990-2019 period where only Portugal grew by threefold while the other countries grew by twofold.

ii.   The original sample to test the null hypothesis

The initial country selection included six countries (n=6) distributed among West, Central Africa, and South Africa.

Table 2 - Initial Countries Selection

Country	Region	Independence date	Colonizer	Political Regime
Nigeria	West Africa	10/1/1960	United Kingdom	Parliamentary Republic
Niger	West Africa	8/3/1960	France	Semi-Presidential Republic
Democratic Republic of Congo	Central Africa	6/30/1960	Belgium	Semi-Presidential Republic
Equatorial Guinea	Central Africa	10/12/1968	Spain	Presidential Republic
Botswana	South Africa	9/30/1966	United Kingdom	Parliamentary Republic
Lesotho	South Africa	10/4/1966	United Kingdom	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy

Sources: Our World in Data (2021) & World Atlas (2021)

The initial selection process had Equatorial Guinee in Central Africa; however, there was no data available to measure the three dependent variables. As a result, the 2nd highest income growth country was selected (Gabon).

The original countries selected to run the model are presented in Table 3 and will be referred to as n=6 :

Table 3 - Revised Countries Selection

Country	Region	Independence date	Colonizer	Political regime
Democratic Republic of Congo	Central Africa	6/30/1960	Belgium	Semi-Presidential Republic
Gabon	Central Africa	8/17/1960	France	Presidential Republic
Botswana	South Africa	9/30/1966	United Kingdom	Parliamentary Republic
Lesotho	South Africa	10/4/1966	United Kingdom	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy
Kenya	East Africa	12/12/1963	UN	Presidential Republic
Tanzania	East Africa	12/10/1963	United Kingdom	Presidential Republic
Niger	West Africa	8/3/1960	France	Semi-Presidential Republic
Nigeria	West Africa	10/1/1960	United Kingdom	Federal Presidential Republic

Sources: Our World in Data (2021) & World Atlas (2021)

The selection considers the diversity of the political regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The data analysis is not conducted at the country level because there are not sufficient data per country to run a regression analysis.

iii. Testing the Model by Increasing the Sample Size

The countries originally selected represented those with the highest and lowest per capita income in their region, with a diversity of presidential regimes and colonizers. I decided to see how the model will respond if two countries were added to the analysis by increasing the sample size from six to eight countries. The criteria to select the countries were different, motivated by the need to see how the model will respond to countries with comparable per capita income. As such the two criteria were to include the region of sub-Saharan Africa that was not in the original sample size and to select two countries with comparable per capita income in 2018. Kenya and Tanzania met the selection criteria with a comparable GDP in 2018. Both countries are renowned for their political stability, a contrast to countries in West Africa, leading the pack with the number of military coups. Thus, the sample was increased from 6 in the original sample (n=6) to 8 the extended sample, to be referred to as n=8, to run the test using the same methodology. The additional countries are Kenya and Tanzania as introduced in Table 4 below:

Table 4 - Countries Added to Increase Sample Size

Country	Region	Independence date	Colonizer	Political Regime
Kenya	East Africa	12/12/1963	United Kingdom	Presidential Republic
Tanzania	East Africa	4/26/1964	United Kingdom	Presidential Republic

Sources: Our World in Data (2021) & World Atlas (2021)

For the purpose of conciseness, the data and information for Kenya and Tanzania are included in relevant sections. This format does not affect the presentation of the results from the first set of regression analysis from the original six countries (Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Lesotho, Niger, and Nigeria) before the presentation of the second regression analysis which adds Kenya and Tanzania to the first six countries.

b. A brief overview of the countries

This section introduces the sample countries by analyzing and comparing their economic growth within each region from the 1960s using the Current Gross Domestic Product (GDP). It also reviews the composition of their economic activities as it relates to output value added as a percentage of GDP in 2010 and 2020 of the four main sectors as reported by the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The economic sectors are classified as (i) Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; (ii) Industry which includes mining, manufacturing, gas, electricity, and water, (iii) Manufacturing which includes the transformation of material components into new products, and (iv) Services which included sales, transportations, travel (hotels/restaurants), financial services and other services such as health, education, and real estates.

As per Figure 4, there are some disparities in the per capita income of the selected countries. The countries with the highest incomes in the sample data grew their economies by multiple folds in comparison with those with the lowest income. however, countries in each selected region had a comparable GDP per Capita in 1960, the base period of the per capita income analysis. GDP ranged from a minimum amount of $41 (Lesotho) to a maximum amount of $281 (Gabon) in 1960. By 2018, the current GDP grew for all the countries in the sample, ranging from a minimum of $545 (the Democratic Republic of Congo) to a maximum of $10,810 (Gabon).

Figure 4 : Current Gross Domestic Product - Orginal Sample (n=6)

Source: World Bank (2020)

i. West Africa

The countries selected in West Africa are Niger and Nigeria. Both became independent in 1960. A former colony of the United Kingdom, Nigeria has the Federal Presidential Republic made up of 36 States and a territory. The Federal Republic is composed of the three branches of the Government – the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial – as per the country's Constitution[19]. According to Nigeria's latest census estimate has a population of approximately 206 million[20] living on an acreage that is 40% less than Niger. Nigeria had nine military coups and fifteen presidents since 1966. Comparatively, Niger had 10 presidents since its independence and witnessed four military coups, making the West African region prone to military coups compared to other regions in the sample. Colonized by France, Niger is a semi-presidential republic with a head of state and a government led by a Prime Minister. Niger had a relatively smaller population than Nigeria, estimated at 24 million in 2019 (Source: World Bank). Both countries had a relatively comparable GDP in 1960, Niger, and Nigeria's GDP per Capita were $133 and $93 respectively (Figure 5); however, this trend changed overtime with Nigeria having four times the per capita income of Niger in 2018, with a per capita income of $2,230 versus $572.

The output distribution as a percentage of GDP differs. In Nigeria, the Service sector represented over 40% of the GDP, despite a decrease in the share in 2020. The second economic sector is Industry with 25% in 2020, followed by the Agriculture sector with 22%. The Manufacturing sector produced less than 15% of GDP in 2020 (Figure 6). In Niger, the Agriculture sector led with 38% in 2020, an increase of 2 points from 2010, followed by the Service sector with 35% in 2020. The Manufacturing Sector represented only 7% of the GDP (Figure 7).

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[19] https://constituteproject.org/countries/Africa/Nigeria?lang=en
[20] 2020 Estimates from World Bank

Figure 5 : Current Gross Domestic Product - Niger and Nigeria

Source: World Bank (2020)

Figure 6: Nigeria GDP per Sector

Source: World Bank (2022)

Figure 7: Niger GDP per Sector

Source: World Bank (2022)

ii.   Central Africa

Like the countries in West Africa, Gabon and the Democratic Republic of Congo obtained their independence in 1960. A former French colony Gabon has a presidential regime. The country only had two presidents since its independence, both from the same political affiliation and lineage. Gabon has an estimated population[21] of 2.2 million in 2020 and is nine times smaller than the Congo, which has an estimated population of 89.5 million in 2020. The Constitution of Gabon, which had several amendments since first voted in 1961, provides many powers to the President, who is elected for seven years with no restrictions on the term limits. The president has the power to dismiss the executive cabinet, the parliament has authority over the selection and dismissal of judges in the country's Supreme Court. The Democratic Republic of Congo, like Niger, is a Semi-Presidential Republic. The country was ruled by three presidents from 1960 to 2018.

In 1960, both countries had comparable GDP per capita. Gabon had a slightly per capita income than the Democratic Republic of Congo, starting with $282 in 1960 versus $220 in the Congo; however, by 2018, Gabon's GDP per Capita was $10,810, approximately 17.54 times the per Capita income of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Figure 8).

The Agriculture sector is relatively small in Gabon, with only 6% of GDP in 2020, an increase of 2 points from 2010. The dominant sector was the Industry sector with over 50% of GDP in 2010; however, the output contribution of this sector was reduced to 37% in 2020. The Service Sector represented 41% of GDP in 2020 while the Manufacturing Sector only represented 16% of the output distribution (Figure 9) as a percentage of GDP. The dominant sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo was the Industry Sector with 35% in 2010 and 2020, followed by the Service Sector despite a decrease in the share in 2020. Unlike in Gabon, Agriculture has a double-digit percentage for its contribution to GDP with 18% in 2020 (Figure 10).

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[21] World Bank data - https://data.worldbank.org/

Figure 8 : Current Gross Domestic Product - Gabon and Democratic Republic of Congo

Source: World Bank (2020)

Figure 9: Gabon GDP per Sector

Source: World Bank (2022)

Figure 10: The Democratic Republic of Congo GDP per Sector

Source: World Bank (2022)

iii.   Southern Africa

Like the countries in West Africa and Central Africa, Botswana and Lesotho became independent in 1966 and both have parliamentarian regimes. Their history and growth differ. Since its independence, Botswana has been a politically stable country, with four presidents in Office from 1960 to 2018, compared with Lesotho which had nine Heads of State during the same period. The population is comparable to 2.1 million habitants in Lesotho versus 2.3 million in Botswana which is over 78 times the size of its neighbor.

In 1960, Botswana had a per capita income of $60 compared to $41 for Lesotho. Over the course of 58 years, 1960-2018, Botswana's per capita income grew to $8,280 in 2018 versus $1,309 for Lesotho during the same period, a difference of sixfold (Figure 11). Both countries have a dominant Service Sector, with over 50% in Lesotho and 60% in Botswana in 2020. On the other end, the least dominant sector is Agriculture representing less than 10% of GDP (Figure 12 and Figure 13)

Figure 11 : Current Gross Domestic Product - Botswana and Lesotho

Source: World Bank (2020)

Figure 12: Botswana GDP per Sector

Source: World Bank (2022)

Figure 13 Lesotho GDP per Sector

Source: World Bank (2022)

iv.   Eastern Africa

Selected to further test the stability of the model, Kenya and Tanzania gained their independence within months of each other. Both have presidential regimes and are known for their pollical stability in their region. From independence to 2018, Kenya and Tanzania had four and five elected presidents respectively. Like any presidential regime, the President is responsible for nominating the head of the government and is accountable to the Parliament. Under the leadership of Presidential Nyerere, Tanzania was a one-party state, leaving the country with unbalanced power at the executive level. The Constitution was amended in 2005 with the aim to provide more equitable distribution of power among the three branches of the government. According to the World Bank 2020 data, Tanzania has a population estimated at 59.7 million living versus 53.7 million in Kenya.

In 1960, Kenya had a GDP per capita of $97 and grew to $1,817 in 2018. GDP per capita for Tanzania became readily available in 1988, with $222 per capita compared to $ 377 for Kenya the same year. By 2018, Tanzania's per capita income grew to $1,122 (Figure 14).

Kenya and Tanzania's leading sectors in the Service Industry, representing 53% and 35% respectively. In line with the policy of President Kikwete, Tanzania aims for a transformation of the Agriculture sector, representing 27% of the GDP in 2020 versus 25% in 2010; hence two points increase during a 10-year period. Moreover, by liberalizing trade and promoting foreign investment, Tanzania's Industry Sector represented 29% of GDP in 2020 (Figure 15). In Kenya, the second leading industry as a percentage of GDP is the Agriculture sector, representing 23% of GDP in 2020. The remaining two sectors, Manufacturing and Industry had less than 25% share of the economy (Figure 16).

Figure 14 : Current Gross Domestic Product - Kenya and Tanzania

Source: World Bank (2020)

Figure 15: Tanzania GDP per Sector

Source: World Bank (2022)

Figure 16: Kenya GDP per Sector

Source: World Bank (2022)

a. Presenting the institutions of the selected countries

The objective of this research is to understand the role of presidential leadership in strengthening public institutions which are defined as Judicial independence, the Protection of Property Rights, and the Legal Enforcement of Contracts during the 1970 – 2018 period. A visual presentation of the evolution of the three institutions during the period under review in the sample countries is presented in Figures 17 thru 24.

Figure 17: Botswana - The Evolution of Public Institutions Overtime

Source: Economic Freedom of the World (2020)

Figure 18: The Democratic Republic of Congo - The Evolution of Public Institutions Overtime

Source: Economic Freedom of the World (2020)

Figure 19: Gabon - The Evolution of Public Institutions Overtime

Source: Economic Freedom of the World (2020)

Figure 20: Lesotho - The Evolution of Public Institutions Overtime

Source: Economic Freedom of the World (2020)

Figure 21: Niger - The Evolution of Public Institutions Overtime

Source: Economic Freedom of the World (2020)

Figure 22: Nigeria - The Evolution of Public Institutions Overtime

Source: Economic Freedom of the World (2020)

Figure 23: Kenya - The Evolution of Public Institution Overtime

Legend: Judicial Independence — Contracts Enforcement — Property rights

Source: Economic Freedom of the World (2020)

Figure 24: Tanzania - The Evolution of Public Institutions Overtime

Source: Economic Freedom of the World (2020)

b. Methodology and data

To respond to the research question, a comparative analysis of the selected eight countries in Sub-Saharan Africa was conducted to understand the correlation between leadership traits of Heads of State and the quality of public institutions over 48 years (1970-2018). Leadership traits were established using a condensed version of the Nieburg Value Continuum. The methodology selected to assign leadership traits was a combination of the use of historical secondary data from textbooks, articles, newspapers, journals, internet reports, written and spoken speeches to establish the leadership style of each head of state in the sample population. This approach differed from the work of Ignacio Arana (2020), who surveyed to collect information on the leadership style of presidents in Latin America. Arana the scholar was confronted with the same difficulties – the lack of reliable biographies in some countries. According to the Author (Arana, 2020), "The available materials for leaders who governed before 1970, did not finish their terms, or belonged to countries that were poor, small or had a small population tended to be extremely limited". For the methodology used in this research, secondary data from academic and gray literature was used to assign personality traits to heads of state.

To provide some consistency in the categorization process, I identified key traits from each of the authors who is on the Nieburg Value Continuum as shown in Figure 2. Keywords such as charisma, legitimacy, unilateral will, excessive use of force, moral authority, transformational, and inclusive were used to assign leadership traits to each president. On the value continuum, differences between the five authors can sometimes be very thin. For instance, for Barber, the morality of the president was important for the success of the presidency; the same was true in the definition of Burns. The main difference between the two scholars can be explained as follow: on one hand, Burns viewed leadership as "a special form of power", where an individual can inspire and motivate his followers to achieve targeted objectives. For Burns, a leader's role is to unlock the potential of their followers, a skill not given to everyone. On the other hand, Barber focused on the morality of presidents, which he believed was formed during childhood. His work focused on the personality of a president versus the demands of the presidency. In other words, a head of state's ability to do the job he is elected to do starts with his personality. On the other side of the spectrum, where leaders use sticks, Cronin argued that leaders must not be too strict and should show some flexibility in the decision-making process. Contrary to Neustadt, where unilateral will

and direct sanctions were among the tools used by a leader to govern, Cronin promoted the use of communication to mitigate the use of a stick. In the middle, Max Weber focused on the legitimacy of a leader. Table 5 provides a summary of the leadership traits using keywords to recapitulate the work of the five scholars. While the summary is not exhaustive, it aims to represent the academic work of the five scholars on leadership and/or presidential leadership and to facilitate the assignation of leadership traits as defined in the realm of this research.

The initial classification used the Nieburg Value Continuum (1991) to catalog personalities according to the Paradigms of Leadership, from Neustadt (Pure Authority) to Burns (Pure Service), and looked at multiple sources to find the most common leadership traits of the president. After the initial classification and to utilize assigned personality traits in the statistical analysis, a dummy variable was created as president heads of state were divided into two groups: a) those of "Service" (Weber, Barbers, and Burns) where dummy and b) those of "Authority" (Neustadt, and Cronin) variable were assigned as such: Service = 1 and Authority = 0. The results are presented for Botswana (Table 6), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Table 7), Gabon (Table 8), Lesotho (Table 9), Niger (Table 10), Nigeria (Table 11), Kenya (Table 12) and Tanzania (Table 13). For each president, additional information is presented about their legacy, accomplishments, and/or failures as their work was relevant to categorize them in the Nieburg Value Continuum.

	Table 5: Nieburg Value Continuum - Key words summarizing the work of Scholars			
Neustadt	**Cronin**	**Weber**	**Barber**	**Burns**
Unilateral will	Pure authority will not work	Charisma	Morality of the presidency	Transformational leadership
Use of a stick	A leader needs to show understanding and flexibility	Legitimacy	Successful performance depends on leaders having the right kind of personalities	Essence of power
Manipulations	Communication is key as stick approach alone might not work	Creates own rules		Values are very important
Direct sanctions	Recruit quality manager	Deterministic	Importance of culture in shaping one's character	Moral authority
Use of the elistist theory of politics		Extraordinary		Ability to unlock potentials

Source: Nieburg (1991)

i. Secondary data collection

The data from this research are from reputable indexes that measure democracy and governance around the world. They include the Economic Freedom of the World data from the Frazer Institute, the democracy and governance data from the Center for Systemic Peace (Polity5)[22], and data from Freedom House, an organization that tracks political rights and civil liberties. The latter was utilized to verify the reliability and consistency of the democracy and governance data from the Economic Freedom Index because of their similarities and to avoid duplication of almost identical variables.

In regard to understanding the relationship between the dependent variables - the quality of the institutions targeted in the research - data were drawn from the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), which "documents the positive relationship between economic freedom and a variety of positive social and economic goals which has collected data from reliable sources since 1950 from developed countries and consistently for most countries since 1970. Data from the IEF is collected from reliable sources such as the World Bank, the Global Competitiveness Report, the World Economic Forum, and the International Country Risk Guide among other reliable sources. The Index covers a wide range of economic freedom indicators, from the size of a government to regulations implemented.

Data were collected for both the dependent and independent variables, except for the leadership traits where an analysis was conducted using academic papers and gray literature to categorize each president.

The main independent variable, president leadership traits, is included in the regression as a dummy variable. Other independent variables include those which might restrict presidential power (executive constraints, political competitiveness, regulation of the electoral process, and regulation of political participation among others) as presidents are selected or self-nominated within a system that cannot be easily changed in the short term. The data are from Polity5 published by the Center for Systemic Peace, collected from 1800 to 2018. The data series is updated yearly, and historical data are corrected when needed to reflect the state of a country each year as more new historical information emerges.

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[22] Polity5 documents political regime characteristics as published by the Center for Systemic Peace

The dependent variables, a proxy of institutions as defined by Judicial Independence, Protection of Property Rights, and the Legal Enforcement of Contracts, are tested individually to understand the impact of presidential power on the quality of the targeted institutions.

ii. The equation

The equation is presented as follows:

$$Public_{inst} = \alpha + \beta'1Lead_{service} + \beta'2Exec_{constraints} + \beta'3Political_{rules} + \beta'4Political_{rivalry} + \beta'5Exec_{selection}$$

Where $Public_{inst}$ represents the measure of the quality of public institutions as defined by property rights, rule of law, and contract enforcement; $Lead_{service}$ is the dummy variable for the leadership style of "Service"[23], $Exec_{constraints}$ represents constraints faced by the executive branch; $Political_{rules}$ is the regulation around the selection process of the head of state, $\beta'4Political_{rivalry}$ is the competitiveness of the political participation in the electoral process, and $Exec_{selection}$ measures the competitive process of succession (hereditary or democratic).

iii. Description of dependent variables

As presented in the equation, the dependent variable is defined as public institutions $Public_{inst}$ which are described as Judicial Independence, the Protection of Property Rights, and the Legal Enforcement of Contracts. The data from the dependent variables are from the Economic Freedom of the World, which created an index by combining data from multiple sources, and are described as follows:

- Judicial Independence measures whether the judiciary is independent of influence from the executive and the legislative branches of the government, the private sector, or individuals. The measurement is derived from the Global Competitiveness Report and the ranks on a scale from 1 to 10.

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[23] $Lead_{authority}$ is the leadership style of "Authority". While the discussion focuses on $Lead_{service}$, there is a small discussion on the contrasts between two styles of leadership.

- Protection of Property Rights describes the extent to which properties and any other types of assets are protected by the law. The scale is from 1 to 7 where 1 = not protected by the law and 7 = well protected by the law. Like the Judicial Independence variable, the data is mainly from the Global Competitiveness Report.

- Legal enforcement of contracts "estimates for the time and money required to collect a debt" or money cost value. It ranks from 1 to 10.

iv.   Description of independent variables

The main independent variable, $Lead_{service}$, measures the leadership style of presidents or heads of state, for countries represented by Prime Ministers. A consolidated version of the Nieburg Value Continuum is used to determine the style of leadership or whether a head of state has authoritative tendencies or not. Leadership traits were assigned after the review of academic and gray literature on the profile of the leader, his decision-making process in nominating public servants, executing his vision, the applicability of the rule of law during his time in office, the perceived legitimacy of the public, corruption as well as the review of data from Freedom House during the period under review to minimize biases when academic articles were not available. Furthermore, some countries like Niger and Nigeria witnessed military coups regularly since independence, spanning over 30 years, with some heads of state being in office during a transition period to ensure a transfer of power from a military to a civil regime – in those cases, limited information was available to provide a deeper understanding of those leaders who were not widely covered by Scholars or the press.

Based on the review of the available academic literature and newsletters, the presidents or heads of state have been classified as follows: Botswana (Table 6), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Table 7), Gabon (Table 8), Lesotho (Table 9), Niger (Table 10), Nigeria (Table 11), Kenya (Table 12) and Tanzania (Table 13). The Paradigm of Leadership for each country includes the characteristics of the presidents as well as their legacies or priorities when they were in office; hence, the tables present information about the perceived character of the head of state and the decisions made that provided a glimpse of their personality. For instance, it was important to highlight whether a president made unilateral decisions or if he consulted his cabinet, whether the

head of state respected the democratic and governance processes or not, whether he used his power to appoint personal connections to his cabinet or not, and whether there was an abuse of power at the highest level or not. This considers the context within the sample countries. For instance,

Table 6 - Nieburg Value Continuum - Botswana's Paradigm of Leadership

	Botswana Presidents from Independence to 2018				
	Seretse Khama	**Quett Masire**	**Festus Mogae**	**Ian Khama**	**Mokgweetsi Masisi ***
Date in Office	30-Sep-66	18-Jul-80	1-Apr-98	1-Apr-08	1-Apr-18
Date out of Office	13-Jul-80	31-Mar-98	1-Apr-08	1-Apr-18	Present
Presidential Regime	Parliamentary	Parliamentary	Parliamentary	Parliamentary	Parliamentary
Political affiliation	Bostwana Democratic Party				
Elected	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Value Continuum	Weber	Burns	Barber	Neustadt	Cronin
Leadership Traits	**Service**	**Service**	**Service**	**Authority**	**Authority**
Characterics	Charisma	Transformational leadership	Morality of the presidency	Unilateral will / Authoritarian	Pure authority does not work
	Legitimacy	The ability to unlock potentials	Successful performance depends on leaders having the right kind of personalities	Use of the elistist theory of politics	Shows understanding and flexibility (community meeting regarding elephant poching policy)
	Determinitic /creates own rules	Values are very important / Moral authority	Importance of culture in shaping one's character	Direct santions	Communication is key as stick approach alone might not work
Legacy of former presidents / Priorities for current president	Adoption of legal procedure	Fiscal prudence - saving for	HIV/AIDS Response	Economic mismanagement /	Job creation to address wealth
	Democracy and the transition from traditionalism to modernism governance structure	Establishment of two-terms limit for presidents	Consolidated democracy by applying the rule of law, transparency in public administration, and maintaining peace and stability in Botswana.	Militarisation of public service / human rights violation / arrests of activities and journalists	Improve service delivery both in the public and private sectors, including investing in infrastructure to attract foreign investment
	Layed the foundation for economic growth (political stability, creating and strengthing public institutions)	Architect of the country economic transformation - Use of diamonds resources du build infrastructure	Market friendly policy developed and education system strengthen	Detoriation of democracy and democratic institutions	Strengthen governance structures
Current president - its leadership on the value continuum may shift after his mandate, this is based on current information available, which is still limited.					

Source: Own elaboration from academic and gray literature available

Table 7: Nieburg Value Continuum - Democratic Republic of Congo's Paradigm of Leadership

	DRC Presidents from Independence to 2018		
	Joseph-Désiré Mobutu	**Laurent-Désiré Kabila**	**Joseph Kabila**
Date in Office	24-Nov-65	17-May-97	26-Jan-01
Date out of Office	16-May-97	16-Jan-01	24-Jan-19
Presidential Regime	Semi-presidential	Semi-presidential	Semi-presidential
Political affiliation	Popular Movement of the Revolution	Independent	People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy
Elected	No	No	No (2001) / Yes (from 2006)
Value Continuum	Neustadt	Neustadt	Cronin
Leadership Traits	**Authority**	**Authority**	**Authority**
Characterics	Mobutuism - creation of Zaire	Authoritarian	Authoritive
	Self-centered, promoted nepotism and clientelism	Anti-secessionist / Nationalist	Repressive
	Brutal disctator	Intransigent	Nepotism
Legacy	Mobutuism - creation of Zaire. Promoted the use of local languges (nationhood). Citizens force to drop western names.	On May 28, 1997, Kabila issued a one-page decree establishing the new constitutional order. It was broad and vague, granting nearly absolute power to the president.	Tried to reconcile different rebellious faction, disarm them and respond with an economic proposal during presidentil campaigns
	Feared that effective officials and efficient bureaucracies would threaten his tenure."	An economic development programbased on authoritarian centralized planning.	Kabila's family either partially or wholly owns more than 80 companies and businesses in the DRC and abroad.
	Under his regime, there were daily extortion and official banditry had come to an end. Judges and procesuctors were corrupt.	Banned leading human right organizations and denied legal registration to more than a hundred others. Arrested / beaten leading journalists.	Mining revenue of more than $1.3bn, double the government's annual budget for the health and education ministry, went missing between 2013 and 2015 before it reached the country's treasury, according to Global Witness.
	"We had to recite one party, one country, one father, Mobutu, Mobutu," said Batodisa, who is now a high school principal at a private school in Kinshasa. "It was ridiculous. You knew it but you could not do anything about it. Not to sing and dance was to commit suicide. You just went along with it."	Perceived as an extension of Mobuto's regime	The Kabila's administration was plagued by corruption.
	Mobutu did not use loans to build state bureaucracies or provide services and actively discouraged the use of loans.		Organized elections that led to a transfert of power

Source: Own elaboration from academic and gray literature available

Table 8: Nieburg Value Continuum - Gabon's Paradigm of Leadership

	Gabon Presidents from Independence to 2018	
	Omar Bongo Ondimba	**Ali Bongo Ondimba**
Date in Office	2 decembre 67	16 octobre 2009
Date out of Office	8 juin 2009	Present
Presidential Regime	Presidential	Presidential
Political affiliation	Parti Democratique Gabonais (sole political party for 22 years)	Parti Democratique Gabonais
Elected	Yes	Yes
Value Continuum	Neustadt	Cronin
Leadership traits	**Authoritative**	**Authoritative**
Characterics	Committed to one party rule	Conflicted (wants reforms but keeps ill acquired wealth)
	Personality cult	A self-proclaimed democrat
	No ideology beyond self-interest	Nepotism (Appointed his son on a basis of merit)
Legacy of former presidents / Priorities for current president	Happy to strike a favorable bargain with the old colonial power	self proclaimed reformist, focused on reducing corruption
	Corruption/nepotism - wealth and power concentrated in the president circle	Committed to conservation and wildlife
	Rule unelected for 26 years. Change the constitutions to remove term limits	Attracted investors to put industrial and agricultural programs to decrease unemployment and help remedy income gap
	Each major tribal groups was represented in the governement to control the opposition	Lavish spending on luxury items
* Current president - its leadership on the value continuum may shift after his mandate, this is based on current information available, which is still limited.		

Source: Own elaboration from academic and gray literature available

Table 9: Nieburg Value Continuum - Lesotho's Paradigm of Leadership

	Leabua Jonathan	Justin Metsing Lekhanya	Elias Phisoana Ramaema	Ntsu Mokhehle	Hae Phoofolo**	Ntsu Mokhehle	Pakalitha Mosisli	Tom Thabane	Pakalitha Mosisli	Tom Thabane*
					Lesotho Heads of State from Independence to 2018					
Date in Office	7-Jul-65	24-Jan-86	2-May-91	2-Apr-93	17-Aug-94	14-Sep-94	29-May-98	8-Jun-12	17-Mar-15	16-Jun-17
Date out of Office	20-Jan-86	2-May-91	2-Apr-93	17-Aug-94	14-Sep-94	29-May-98	8-Jun-12	17-Mar-15	16-Jun-17	19-May-20
Presidential Regime	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy
Political affiliation	Basotho National Party	Military	Military	Basutoland Congress Party	Independent	Basutoland Congress Party	Lesotho Congress for	All Basotho Convention	Democratic Congress	All Basotho Convention
Elected	Yes	No	No	Yes	Interim	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Value Continuum	Neustadt	Neustadt	Barber	Cronin	N/A	Cronin	Cronin	Neustadt	Cronin	Neustadt
Leadership Traits	**Authority**	**Authority**	**Service**	**Authority**	**N/A**	**Authority**	**Authority**	**Authority**	**Authority**	**Authority**
Characteristics	Use of sanctions/force/coercicion/oppresor	Use of sanctions/force/coercicion/oppresor	Lead by exemple ("His car did not have a reverse" famous quote to demonstrate his will to move forward with democracy)	Machiavelich (viewed the state as an organism with its ruler and the head and its people as the body)		Machiavelich (viewed the state as an organism with its ruler and the head and its people as the body)	Followed the footsteps of his member - Ntsu Mokhehle -- with machiavelism politicking	Suspended the constitution when things did not go is way	Followed the footsteps of his member - Ntsu Mokhehle -- with machiavelism politicking	Suspended the constitution when things did not go is way
	Use of political influence to hire civil servants aligned to the party	Mlitary rule with no respects to the rule of law	Champion of political and civil rights	Self-interest		Self-interest	Unilateral appointment of cabinet members and members of Senate -	Machiavelich who viewed the state as an organism with its ruler and the head and its people as the body	Unilateral appointment of cabinet members and members of Senate -	Machiavelich who viewed the state as an organism with its ruler and the head and its people as the body
	Refusal to concede defeat in 1970 by forcefully remaining in power until a military coup - Unconstitutional ruler	Muzzled all organised political formations that disapproved of the coup, particularly the national political parties	Morality of the Presidency	No fixed principles		No fixed principles	Dictorial tendencies (Not consulting his cronies --> seen as dictatorial and authoritarian. Perceived as inept, inefficient, undemocratic leader and a divider within his party. Also made unilateral decisions	Reports/rumors of corruption with the private sector - job given to one of his sons for favors	Dictorial tendencies (Not consulting his cronies --> seen as dictatorial and authoritarian. Perceived as inept, inefficient, undemocratic leader and a divider within his party. Also made unilateral decisions	Reports/rumors of corruption with the private sector - job given to one of his sons for favors
Legacy of former presidents / Priorities for current president	From small scale development project executed at the local level to higher scale projects managed at the national level	A bastion of corruption and a bulwark against democracy, banning popular organisations and abolishing genuine rural development committees and replacing them with chiefs-subordinated councils.	Restablished civilian ruling with the elections and subsequent transfert of Power to civilians	Seen as the father of democracy who was forced to exil despite winning the 1970 election as Jonathan refused to concede.		Seen as the father of democracy who was forced to exil despite winning the 1970 election as Jonathan refused to concede.	Not addressing party internal problems and divisions. Failure to raise civil servant salary on a par with inflation.	His wife influenced his cabinet decisions.	Not addressing party internal problems and divisions. Failure to raise civil servant salary on a par with inflation.	His wife influenced his cabinet decisions.
	Reduced the freedom of the press and the halt of multiparty democracy	Banning of international aids as a result of severing ties with selected countries	Removed Order No. 4, the Suspension of Political Activities Order (outlaw political parties and criminalize public display of party emblems)	As a politician, Ntsu was known among his opponents as a man of no fixed principles; he took any political position that served his current interests		As a politician, Ntsu was known among his opponents as a man of no fixed principles; he took any political position that served his current interests	Seen as the head of Lesotho INC - appointments were made unilaterally. Ministers seen uncompetent were not replaced	Worked as ministers under previous governement	Seen as the head of Lesotho INC - appointments were made unilaterally. Ministers seen uncompetent were not replaced	Worked as ministers under previous governement
	Weakens institutions - no long-term goals or vision - the goal was to charm the electorate to remain in power	established Order No. 4, the Suspension of Political Activities Order	Restored constitutional ruling	Unable to lead his party as there were different factions/tendence. He created a new party in the hope of providing more support to the majority of parliamentarians		Unable to lead his party as there were different factions/tendence. He created a new party in the hope of providing more support to the majority of parliamentarians	Unilateral appointment of cabinet members and members of Senate - Nomination of senior civil servants and ambassadors abroad without consultation with his party Executive Committee and Members of Parliament (note: the constituion - Section 87 does give the PM the power for unilateral decision to hire and replace ministers)	Use of force when necessary - allies accused of murder attemprs on Mosisli. Killing of former wife two days before inauguration as a prime minister	Unilateral appointment of cabinet members and members of Senate - Nomination of senior civil servants and ambassadors abroad without consultation with his party Executive Committee and Members of Parliament (note: the constituion - Section 87 does give the PM the power for unilateral decision to hire and replace ministers)	Use of force when necessary - allies accused of murder attemprs on Mosisli. Killing of former wife two days before inauguration as a prime minister

President as of 1/1/2019 - its leadership on the value continuum may shift after his mandate, this is based on current information available, which is still limited.

**Transition period was too short and information about the Prime Minister was limited*

Source: Own elaboration from academic and gray literature available (2021)

	Hamani Diori	Seyni Kountche	Ali Saibou	Mahamane Ousmane	Ibrahim Bare Mainassara	Daouda Malam Wanke**	Mamadou Tandja	Salou Djibo	Mahamadou Issoufou*
Niger Presidents from Independence to 2018									
Date in Office	10-Nov-60	17-Apr-74	14-Nov-87	16-Apr-93	27-Jan-96	11-Apr-99	22-Dec-99	18-Feb-10	5-Apr-11
Date out of Office	15-Apr-74	10-Nov-87	16-Apr-93	27-Jan-96	9-Apr-99	22-Dec-99	18-Feb-10	7-Apr-11	2-Apr-21
Presidential Regime	Semi-Presidential Republic	Semi-Presidential Republic	Semi-Presidential Republic	Semi-Presidential Republic	Semi-Presidential Republic	Semi-Presidential Republic	Semi-Presidential Republic	Semi-Presidential Republic	Semi-Presidential Republic
Political affiliation	PPN-RDA	Military	Military / MNSD-Nassara	CSD-Rahama	Military/UNIRD/RDP-Jama'a	Military	MNSD-Nassara	Military	PNDS-Tarayya
Elected	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Value Continuum	Neustadt	Neustadt	Barber	Cronin	Cronin		Neustadt	Barber	Burns
Leadership Traits	**Authority**	**Authority**	**Service**	**Authority**	**Authority**		**Authority**	**Service**	**Service**
Characteristics	Unilateral decision	One-man tyranny	Democrat who favor the creation of multiple political parties	Unwilling to compromise	Repressive regime		Unilateral decision (Dissolved the parliament and amended constitutions to remain in power)	Not Charismatic	Transformational leadership
	One party ruler	Repressive regime	Changemaker	Unable to lead	Unilateral decision		Autocratic	High morals	Moral authority
Legacy of former presidents / Priorities for current president	He had complete executive powers and was not accountable to Parliament. He had the authority to veto parliamentary bills, (by perpetually suspending the second reading), and at the same time had the power to enact legislation by ordinance.	The military regime was extremely harsh and repressive with its own people	Facilitated the instauration of democracy.	Cohabilation problems between him and his PM Mahamane Issoufou. Constitution gave conflicting roles to president and PM	Self-appointment as head of the National Salvation Council, he suspended the constitution and banned political parties.	Organized the election after the coup and handed the presidency to Tandja	By December 2009, Tandia was expected to step down from power, but six months earlier he dissolved parliament and dismissed the courts while creating a referendum that allowed his tenure to continue until 2012.	Led the military coup to remove Tandja from office because the latter did not want to vacate the office of the presidency after his term was completed	Known for his efforts to develop the economic development of the country and strive for regional stability
	He had powers for ministerial appointments, without scrutiny by any other authority, as well as powers of appointments and terminations in the armed forces and in the civil service.	He claimed to be the captain of the ship that is Niger.	Worked to fight corruption	Institutional crisis as a result of the crisis with the Prime Minister --> constitutional crisis leading to a non-functional governement. Both the head of state and the head of the government went on strike.	"Facing the cutoff of financial aid from both the United States and France, Maïnassara arranged for new elections in July, which he won under questionable circumstances".		"Tandja jailed a clerk for losing track of rice stores. He locked up others for keeping unclean offices. He jailed a farmer jaywalking on a rural road as his motorcade approached. One man I knew was imprisoned for having a broken water faucet when Tandja visited his home."	His priority was to return the power to civilian.	For Mr Issoufou, hailed as "leading his people on a path of progress", he will be remembered as the man who helped Niger drop the "coup-prone West African country" tag, and it is a legacy that will last longer than his $5m prize money.
	Neither the authoritarian nature of the regime nor its narrow ethno-regional base were at issue in provoking the change of government and both characteristics not only continued but were aggravated under the military regime	Turned the whole country into a virtual military cantonment with gendarmes controlling the movement and activities of people. People disappeared for careless comments.	Established a commission to draft a pre-constitutional document, with a new constitution in 1989.	Dissolved the National Assembly	Opposition parties questioned the legitimacy of the president.		Tandja jailed a clerk for losing track of rice stores, an act that made him a man of the people, protector of the food. He locked up others for keeping unclean offices. He jailed a farmer jaywalking on a rural road as his motorcade approached. One man I knew was imprisoned for having a broken water faucet when Tandja visited his home.	Seen as a hero who ousted the autocratic president Mamadou Tandja	Respected the term limits. Known for building democratic and governance institution -->
	He was also the Secretary-General of the ruling party and controlled the party machine. Did not pretend to try liberal democratic model.	One-man tyranny that only ended with his death in 1987.	Saibou handed the presidency over to Mahamane on April 16—the first time that the incumbent president peacefully handed over power to the opposition—and retired to his home village	There was a stand-off between the two parts of the executive. On 27 January 1996, the day when it was rumoured that the president was going to dissolve the legislature for a second time, the military stepped in and Niger's first experiment with electoral democracy came to an end	Opposition parties continued to question the president's legitimacy and there was violence during local elections in February 1999 that the opposition looked to be winning.		Re-elected in 2004, Tandja amended the constitution in 2009, enabling him to stay in power.		Received the Mo Ibrahim Leadership prize for Achievement in African Leadership

*President as of 1/1/2019 - its leadership on the value continuum may shift after his mandate, this is based on current information available, which is still limited.

** Transition period was too short and information about the Prime Minister was limited

Source: Own elaboration from academic and gray literature available (2021)

Table 11: Nieburg Value Continuum - Nigeria's Paradigm of Leadership

	Nigeria Presidents from Independence to 2018												
	Yakubu Gowon	Murtala Mohammed	Olusegun Obasanjo	Alhaji Shehu Shagari	Muhammadu Buhari	Ibrahim Babangida	Ernest Shonekan**	Sani Abacha	Abdulsalami Abubakar	Olusegun Obasanjo	Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar'Adua	Goodluck Jonathan	Muhammadu Buhari*
Date in Office	1-Aug-66	29-Jul-75	13-Feb-76	1-Oct-79	31-Dec-83	27-Aug-85	26-Aug-93	17-Nov-93	8-Jun-98	29-May-99	29-May-07	5-May-10	29-May-15
Date out of Office	29-Jul-75	13-Feb-76	1-Oct-79	31-Dec-83	27-Aug-85	26-Aug-93	17-Nov-93	8-Jun-98	29-May-99	29-May-07	5-May-10	29-May-15	Incumbent
Presidential Regime	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal Presidential Republic
Political affiliation	Military Federal Government	Military Federal Government	Military Federal Government	Nigeria National party	Supreme Military Council	Armed Forces Ruling Council	Independent	Provisional Ruling Council	Provisional Ruling Council	People's Democratic Party	People's Democratic Party	People's Democratic Party	All Progressives Congress
Elected	No	No	No	yes	No	No	Interim	No	No	Yes	Yes	Interim, then elected	Yes
Value Continuum	Neustadt	Weber	Burns	Burns	Cronin	Neustadt	N/A	Neustadt	Barber	Burns	Barber	Barber	Cronin
Leadership Traits	Authority	Service	Service	Service	Authority	Authority	N/A	Authority	Service	Service	Service	Service	Authority
Characterics	Authoritative - refuse to concede power to civilian	Charismatic authority	Effective leadership	Transformational leader	Strict	Unilateral decision		Dictator	Had the right personality to lead to the election	Effective leadership	Integrity/humility	Negotiator / peacemaker	Democratic president with military mindset
	Self-promoted	Personality cult	A nationalist that promoted Nigeria cultural unity	Able to unlock potentials	Autocratic leanings			Had absolute power	Democrat	A nationalist that promoted Nigeria cultural unity	High morals		unenergetic personality
	Presided an unitarian government	Change-maker	Reformist	Moral authority	Inflexible					Reformist	Reformist		Autocratic leanings
Legacy of former presidents / Priorities for current president	Issued the infamous "Decree No. 34" to abrogate the country's federal structure in exchange for a unitary one	Promoted a centralized governement and spured growth	Budgetary cutback and expansion in access to free school education	Improved the quality of education	Repressed the press by passing a decree. Favored the use of military tribunals for journalists and publishers for writtings which might impact the military government.	Delayed then annuled elections		Human rights violations	Modified the 1979 constitution to allow multi-party elections	Budgetary cutback and expansion in access to free school education	During his first administration the levels of freedom experienced by Nigerians increased; freedom of the press allowed for considerable criticism of the president.	Instrumental in negotiating an agreement with militant groups	Administration is perceived as less corrupt
	Suspended the constitution	Detribalized Nigerian	Committed to oversow the 1979 election and handed power to a civilian president	Launched a mass literacy campagn	Decree to investigate assets of public officials linked to corruption	Cleaned the political system to minimize the influence of money.		Issued a decree to place the government above the juridictions of the courts	Supporter of Abacha's regime	Committed to oversow the 1979 election and handed power to a civilian president	Did not allow the presidency to change him	His government was perceived as highly corrupt	His administration enacted decrees to investigate corruption and control foreign exchange
	Restricted the freedom of the presse and passed a decree for the unification of Nigeria.	His terms was saw repression and economic prosperity with improved quality of life of the citizens	Depolitize the army (after being democratically elected). Tried to change the constitution to abolish term limits	Encouraged Women and the Youth in building the country. Appointed first women ministers and ambassadors	Cut back on excesses in national expenditures	Implemented a Structural Adjustment Plan to strengthen economic activities.		His governement helped reduce external debts and invested in road construction.	Encouraged political debates	Depolitize the army (after being democratically elected). Tried to change the constitution to abolish term limits	Declared his assets upon taking office - first to do so	His government led reforms which led to a credible election.	Working to remove corruption within the government
		Promoted a unified nigeria with a participatory approach of all citizens.	Issued decree (Land Use)to give the State the propriety rights over all land with the aim to stop land hoarding and land speculation,	Layed the ground work for Nigeria infrastructure building	Worked to remove corruption within the government	Influenced by his friends in the decision-making process		High corruption which included family members		Issued decree (Land Use)to give the State the propriety rights over all land with the aim to stop land hoarding and land speculation,	Slow to implement promised reforms and died in office before any substantial change	Failed to respond to pressing issues such as kidnapping, corruption, security	
Current president - its leadership on the value continuum may shift after his mandate, this is based on current information available, which is still limited.													
*** Transition period was too short and information about the President was limited*													

Source: Own elaboration from academic and gray literature available

Table 12: Nieburg Value Continuum - Kenya's Paradigm of Leadership

	Jomo Kenyatta	Daniel Arap Moi	Mwai Kibaki	Uhuru Kenyatta
Date in Office	12-Dec-64	22-Aug-78	30-Dec-02	9-Apr-13
Date out of Office	22-Aug-78	30-Dec-02	9-Apr-13	Present
Presidential Regime	Presidential System	Presidential System	Presidential System	Presidential System
Political affiliation	Kenya African National Union	Kenya African National Union	National Rainbow Coalition (1st Term)	The National Alliance (1st Term)
			Party of National Unity (2nd Term)	Party of National Unity (2nd Term)
Elected	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Value Continuum	Cronin	Neustadt	Barber	Cronin
Leadership Traits	*Authority*	*Authority*	*Service*	*Authority*
Characterics	Dictatorial	Authoritarian	Low key	Micro Manager
	Authoritarian	Human rights abuse	Competent Technocrate	Human rights abuse
Legacy of former presidents / Priorities for current president	Father of independence	Controlled the media	Established anti-corruption courts, yielding limited results	Improved doing business conditions in the country and reinforced regional integration
	"Kenyatta's period in power was characterised by one-party dictatorship, cronyism and the politicising of ethnicity"	Political realities dictated that he would continue to be beholden to the system of government that Kenyatta had created and to whose headship he had acceded, including the nearly dictatorial powers vested in his office	Tribalism problems remained in Kenya	Enacted laws that restricted basic rights in the name of national security.
	Facilicated corruption – which included wealth channeled to his family – most of it documented after his death.	Facilitated multi-partism in Kenya. He yet dismissed political opponents and consolidated his power	Supported the drafting of Kenya's Vision 2030	Faced charges from the International Criminal Court (ICC) over violence in the 2007 elections, which were later drop because the ICC could not investigate as the Government of Kenya "hindered" the investigation.
	Aimed for free universal education - Achieved 85% within 10 years. Also promoted regional integration and was instrumental with the creation of East African Community	After the fall of the Soviet Regime, aid was withheld pending economic and political reforms	Reduce dependence on international aids / Introduced free primary school education	Organized crime reported by Freedom of the World Reports which negatively affect doing business in the country
	According to Donald Savage "Kenyatta believed in the importance of authority and tradition"	Amnesty International documented abuse during his regime. "They have not succeeded. Human rights abuses have increased, opposition rallies have been hampered, opposition political leaders have been jailed and harassed, and violent episodes designed to incite ethnic conflict have been traced directly to Kenya's official security and police services."	Could not contain endemic corruption	Non-Governemental organization reported human rights abuse by Kenyan Security Forces. Limited investigations are reported on the abuse.
* Current president – its leadership on the value continuum may shift after his mandate, this is based on current information available, which is still limited.				

Source: Own elaboration from academic and gray literature available (2021)

Table 13: Nieburg Value Continuum - Tanzania's Paradigm of Leadership

	Julius Nyerere	Ali Hassan Mwinyi	Benjamin Willian Mkapa	Jakaya Kikwete	John Pombe Magufuli*
Date in Office	29-Oct-64	5-Nov-85	23-Nov-95	21-Dec-05	5-Nov-15
Date out of Office	5-Nov-85	23-Nov-95	21-Dec-05	5-Nov-15	17-Mar-21
Presidential Regime	Presidential System	Presidential System	Presidential System	Presidential System	Presidential System
Political affiliation	Tanganika African National Union	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
	Chama Cha Mapinduzi (from 1977)				
Elected	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Value Continuum	Weber	Burns	Burns	Burns	Neustadt
Leadership Traits	**Service**	**Service**	**Service**	**Service**	**Authoritarian**
Characterics	Equalitarian	Impartial	Equality	Charismatic	Oppressor of civil liberties
	Sense of fairness	Righteous	Reformist	Diplomat	
	Principled	A reformist	Compassionate		
Legacy of former presidents / Priorities for current president	In his own words : "where there is one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be when you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community!"	Liberalize trade and the economy, away from Nyerere socialism policies. Reduced public spending, lifted import and price control. Helped Tanzania become investment friendly.	Privatized state-owned corporations and instituted free market policies which won the support of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund	Promoted freedom of press and media	Centralized power at the executive level.
	Believed in the social aspect of African traditions as such the well-being of the community was important to him. He also believed in gender equality and the role of women for a balanced society. His views helped Tanzania to be a stable and peaceful country.	Dismissed cabinet members involved in corruption.	His anti-corruption policies were ineffective and he was critized for spending 15 M pounds in a presidential airplane	Promoted the transformation of the agriculture sector in the country.	Obstructed democracy with arrests of opposants and protestors, social media obstruction.
	His economic policies were not successful. He refused international aids and loans from international organizations. Country had high debt, high poverty, low agricultural production.	Facilitated the transition to multi-partism	Brought marginalized populations to discussed developmental programs	Setting macro-econmic fundamentals. Expanded educational opportunities despite the flaws in the quality of education.	Imposed measures to curb government spendings, such as reducing what he deemed unnecessary foreign travel by government officials such as ban on business class travel, reducing the size of the delegation, and not sponsoring major events such as World AIDS Day or Independence day celebration in favor of a cleaning campaign. He reducedhis own salary. He helped reduced corruption within his administration.
	Facilitated the succesful merger of Zanzibar and Tanganika	Consolidated the merger of Zanzibar and Tanganika	Facilitated / promoted access to justice/ legal systethrough community-driven and rights-based approaches to development initiatives	Invested in research and development with the aim to revolutionize the agricultural sector.	His economic policies helped Tanzania witnessed one of the strongest economic growth as savings from reduced public spending and corruption were reinvested in the country's industries and infrastructure.
	Bjerk characterised him as being "neither saint nor tyrant, Nyerere was a politician who kept his integrity and vision in a harsh and changing world."		Build institutions and public governance - from regulatory authorities to promoting access to justice.	Continued the work of his predecessors on governance, access to justice and fiscal discipline.	Against same-sex mariage. Banned HIV/AIDs outreach projects. Also disputed the effectiveness of mask during the Covid-19 pandemic

Died in office

Source: Own elaboration from academic and gray literature available (2021)

according to the Freedom of the World Report, from 1972 to 2018 the Democratic Republic of Congo was "not free"; Botswana was "free", except in 1972; Niger and Gabon became "partially free" in early 1990, coinciding with the democratic wave in Sub-Saharan Africa; Lesotho was "partially free" from 1972 while Nigeria flipped back and forth between "free" and "partially free" because of the military coups. In Eastern Africa, Kenya was "partially free" from 1972 to 1987 at which point the country was classified "not free" until 1992 when it became "partially free". Tanzania was classified as not "free" until 1994 and "partially free" from 1995.

In addition to the leadership style as a dummy variable, four independent variables were selected to appreciate the existing institutional system which may limit the influence of presidential power on the positive quality of public institutions[24]. They are indicators that measure the extent to which a regime is democratic or autocratic.

For the purpose of this research, we selected the following 4 indicators which might influence presidential power: Executive Constraint s($Exec_{constraints}$), Regulation of Participation ($Political_{rules}$), Competitiveness of the Participation ($Political_{rivalry}$), and Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment ($Exec_{selection}$). The definitions of each variable are as described in the 2018 Polity5 Manual.

Data were selected by the Polity5, a dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace which collects information from Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions since 1800. The Polity rating is inspired by Eckstein & Gurr (1975) who described the structure of the decision-making process as follows: "Making such decisions requires that supers and subs be able to recognize when decision-processes have been concluded". The variables are ranked from 1 to 7 (1 = unlimited authority, 2 = intermediate category, 3 = slight to moderate limitation on executive authority, 4 – intermediate category, 5 = substantial limitation on executive authority, 6= intermediate category and 7 = executive parity or subordination). The four independent variables are presented as described by Polity5.

Executive Constraints or $Exec_{constraints}$ refers to "the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such constraints may be imposed by any accountability group". In any society, whether autocratic

or democratic, leaders are part of a societal group that has written (constitution/legislation) or unwritten rules (traditions), there exist checks and balances even within an autocratic society with one party ruling system. $Exec_{constraints}$ is measured on a scale from 1 to 7 as follow: 1 = unlimited authority where there are no regulation and/or constitutions and legislation are ignored, revised, or suspended so the Head of State can govern as he pleases. 2 = intermediate category, 3 = slightly to moderate limitation on executive authority where there are some restrictions in changing the constitutions and where the legislature has initiate some legislations or block executive decrees and where there is an independent justice system; 4 = intermediate category, 5 = substantial limitations on executive authority where the executive is accountable to others and groups; 6 = intermediate category, and 7 = executive parity or subordination where " accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activities" and where "a legislature, ruling party or councils initiates much or most important legislation" or where in parliamentary regimes, the president or head of state " is chosen by the accountability group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office"

Regulation of Participation or $Political_{rules}$ describes how participation in the political process is regulated and/or controlled by the ruling authority. $Political_{rules}$ scale is from 1 to 5 as follows: 1 = unregulated where "the political participation is fluid" and there are " no systematic regime controls on political activities", 2 = multiple identities where political participation is relatively stable and led by groups with common interests, 3 = sectarian where multiple groups have incompatible interests, 4 = restricted where only some political participation is permitted and some groups are excluded from the political process, and 5 = regulated where political groups competes regularly for political influence.

Competitiveness of Participation or $Political_{rivalry}$ measures the extent to which "alternative preference for political leadership and policy can be pursued in the political arena". This variable measures political participation and the implication of civil society in the process and has the following established ranking" 0 = not applicable, 1 = repressed where no opposition is permitted, 2 = suppressed where political competition is limited and where political organization or actions may be limited or prohibited, including limiting the role of the opposition and the media with intimidation, harassment, 3 = factional where distinct groups push their own agenda, 4 = transitional, and 5 = competitive where competition among groups is constant). The equation also

takes into two constant variables. The first one represents the type of presidential regimes (presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary, or federal republic) and the second variable, represents the disturbance of the presidential regimes by military coups.

Competitiveness of executive selection or $Exec_{selection}$ ranks the selection process of presidents or heads of state and analyzes whether succession is hereditary or based on a competitive process where elections determine the outcomes. $Exec_{selection}$ is classified as follows: 0= selection where transfer of power is coded unregulated or "involve in a transition to/from unregulated, 1= selection where the head of state is determined " by hereditary succession, designation or by a combination of both" with examples such as " replacement of presidents before terms, military selection of civilian executives, single party selection or unopposed elections", 2 = dual/transitional where executives are selected by hereditary succession (kingship) and by a competitive process (Prime Minister) as in the case of the UK, and 3 = election where presidents are selected thru a competitive electoral process.

v. Testing the model by increasing the sample size

The original selection had six countries (n=6) – Niger and Nigeria in West Africa, Gabon and the Democratic Republic of Congo in Central Africa, and Botswana and Lesotho in Southern Africa. The countries were selected using a defined set of criteria as documented on pages 42-44. The first part of the analysis (n=6) using the step-by-step methodology is initially presented. To further test the model, two countries were added from Eastern Africa, Kenya, and Tanzania. The selection criteria slightly differed – instead of the highest and lowest GDP in the region, countries with comparable per capita income in 2018 were selected. This allowed us to understand if leadership traits had an influence on the quality of public institutions regardless of the income growth during the same period. The result of the analysis of the second set of regressions with eight countries is presented for each of the institutions and compared with the results from the original sample size.

vi. Limitations

During the data collection phase, after establishing the sample population size, I was confronted with the lack of data for some of the countries. In the country selection, Equatorial Guinea had the highest per capita income; however, there was no data available to measure the

dependent variables (Judicial Independence, Protection of Property Rights, and Legal Enforcement of Contracts); as such, the country was removed from the analysis and the second highest per capita income in the region (Gabon) was selected.

Comparing the influence of political power on the quality of institutions overtime was not a linear exercise. Indeed, countries are not on the same electoral calendar or there were unexpected changes of power because of military coups. To remediate, the regression considered yearly data for sample countries to ensure comparability during the time under review. As such, each country is covered for a period of 48 years, from 1970 to 2018. From 1970 to 2000, data was only available every 5 years for all countries, as a result, the same average was used as follows: data available for 1970 covers 1970-1974, data available for 1975 covers 1975-1979, data available for 1980 covers 1980-1984, data available for 1985 covers 1985-1989, data available for 1990 covers 1990-1994, and data available for 1995 covers 1995-1999. The reason for using yearly data is because the presidency period is different for each of the selected countries and the timeframe is uneven. While the selection of the timeframe was driven by data availability, the other factor considered is the timeframe – on a shorter period, the analysis will be flawed.

In regard to Legal Enforcement of Contracts, with the exception of Nigeria, data only became available in 1990. This information was used as the baseline for that dependent variable for the 1970-1990 period.

Other governance data was considered; however, they could not be part of the model. The reason is data only became readily available from the countries in 2000s, limiting the testing of additional data from reliable sources. For instance, Transparency International began tracking the Perception Corruption Index in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005 in a consistent manner while the Ibrahim Index of African Governance only started in 2010.

An additional limitation is related to the time lag as the impact of decisions made can take months to go into effect and the data does not allow to measure this. As such, the personality traits are only considered when the person was in office. When a president took office after July of a given year, the personality traits assigned remain one of his predecessors for that year only. If a president covered a transition period of less than a year, no personality traits were assigned to the person in the office. This happens in only three instances as highlighted in Table 9, Table 10, and Table 11.

Multiple regressions were run to gradually add independent variables to the equation to understand the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. This step-by-step testing of individual data allows us to understand the redundancy of some of the independent variable tests. For instance, with each addition in the regression, the influence of presidential power diminishes based on the type of democracy, the regulation around elections, and the competitiveness of the electoral process. Furthermore, each dependent variable was tested using the same formula allowing the understanding of the degree of influence presidents have on selected public institutions.

The regressions were run with data from six countries (n=6), with a total of 294 observations, to test the null hypothesis. Those countries were representative in demonstrating the disparity between the highest GDP per capita income and the lowest GDP per capita income. In the country presentation on pages 45 -72, the available GDP data showed that countries in the same region had comparable GDP per capita in 1960. While countries with the highest GDP in the sample were able to increase their per capita income by multiple folds, countries with the lowest per capita income were not able to follow the same trends despite gaining their independence in the same period.

This process and the results are described in the data analysis section.

V.   ANALYSIS

This section presents the result of the research findings. The analysis began with stating the objective of the research as well as the null hypothesis that was tested. It then provides information about the descriptive statistics for the first analysis of the original six countries (n=6), followed by the presentation of the results obtained from the sample size of eight (n=8), and concludes with a comparative analysis of the two-regression analysis. This is followed by an analysis of the evolution of public institutions at the country level to see how the three public institutions tested responded to the same leadership trait in the same timeframe. The analysis also discusses the limitation of the research, the inconsistencies of the data when compared to other reliable sources, and the incremental changes in the quality of public institutions as a result of system constraints.

The objective of the research is to identify whether presidential power has an influence on the quality of public institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa and to answer the following research question: "Can presidents in Sub-Saharan Africa use their executive power to strengthen public institutions as defined in the context of the research?". This is done by testing the following hypothesis:

H0: The quality of public institutions is not influenced by the leadership style of the Head of State.

H1: The quality of public institutions is influenced by the leadership style of Heads of State

The null hypothesis is initially tested using the data from 6 countries (n=6) out of 41 in the targeted region, during a 48-year period with a total of 294 observations. This represented approximately 15% of the countries under review. Countries had different regime schedules, either because of the different electoral calendars, and regimes, or related to military coup interruption. This did not affect the sample size since the period under review is the same. Table 14 provides a summary of the number of heads of state during the period under review.

Table 14: Number of Heads of States by country from 1970 - 2018

	Botswana	DRC	Gabon	Lesotho*	Niger**	Nigeria***
Number of Heads of States (1970-2018)	4	3	2	9	9	13
Number of years under review	48	48	48	48	48	48
	* The presdency of Ntsu Mokhele was temporarely suspended for 1 month. The interruption was not considered in the count. PM Thabane returned to office after 2					
	** Some presidents had less than a year in office					
	*** Two former presidents under the military regimes were elected years later					

Source: Archontology.org (2021)

The null hypothesis was tested a second time with the data from Kenya and Tanzania, increasing the sample size to eight, representing approximately 20% of the population size and with 394 observations. The number of presidents in both countries during the period under review is presented in Table 15.

Table 15: Number of Heads of States for Kenya and Tanzania from 1970 - 2018

	Kenya	Tanzania
Number of Heads of States (1970-2018)	4	5
Number of years under review	48	48

Source: Archontology.org (2021)

The null hypothesis was tested individually against each dependent variable representing the definition of public institution as described in the literature review. Because the aim is to understand the correlation between the leadership traits of a head of state and the quality of those institutions, the weight of the system in which a leader operates cannot be overlooked. As such, four additional independent variables were included to assess how an established governance system can restrict the power bestowed to the head of state.

The analysis begins at the macro-level by conducting a comparative analysis of the trends in the sample countries for each dependent variable to understand how leadership traits influence the quality of institutions.

MS Excel was used to conduct the multilinear linear regression analysis of each dependent variable. In the null hypothesis significance testing, the p-value is set at .05.

a. Dependent Variable 1: *Judicial Independence*

The first definition of a public institution in the research, Judicial Independence, measures the independence of the judiciary from any external influence from the established system.

The analysis from the original sample size, n=6, began with a step-by-step regression analysis provided in Table 16. Test 1 demonstrated that non-authoritative leadership traits had a positive influence on Judicial Independence, though the model could only explain 15% of the dependent variable, despite its statistical significance. By including the first variable, $Exec_{constraints}$, the influence of the head of state remained positive with a slight decrease in the coefficient (1.12); however, $Exec_{constraints}$ had a positive impact on strengthening the quality of the institution under review, supporting that a system with an oversight structure did positively increase the quality of the institution. Because Test 2, only explained 23% of $Public_{inst}$, a third variable, $Political_{rules}$, was included in the equation. By introduction $Political_{rules}$, both $Lead_{service}$ had a R-Squared (R2) of .47 and a p-value superior to .05; hence, not statistically significant. In this test, $Exec_{constraints}$ coefficient increased from .01 (Test 2) to .30 (Test 3), reducing the influence of $Lead_{service}$ from a coefficient of 1.12 to .23. In addition to a p-value great than .05, $Political_{rules}$ had a negative influence on $Public_{inst}$, Judicial Independence. This can be explained by the fact that 5 out of 6 countries had regulations that were either strict, restrictive political participation, or sectarian, favoring members of the group in power; and some inconsistency in the data as detailed in subsequent sections.

I proceeded with Test 4, where $Political_{rivalry}$ was included. Test 4, explained by 55% of the dependent variable and the p-value of the four independent variables were within .05 and had a positive influence on the quality of Judiciary Independence, except for $Political_{rules}$ which seemed to have a negative influence on the dependent variable. The influence of $Lead_{service}$ decreased to .34 compared to 1.2 from Test 1. As per the figures of Test 5, 57% of the dependent variable under consideration was explained by the independent variables, which is over 50% of the observed variables. With a static significance of .00000 and a p-value for each independent

variable of less than .05, we rejected the null hypothesis that the quality of the judiciary is not influenced by the leadership style of a country's President.

Table 16 and Table 17 provide the summary of the regression model. The main difference was the main independent variable, $Lead_{service}$ and $Lead_{authority}$ and highlighted that a president with leadership traits of "Service" had a positive coefficient and positively influence the quality of public institutions while leadership traits of "Authority" had a negative coefficient; hence, negatively impacting the quality of the public institution. Except for the change in coefficient of the main independent variable, the results remain the same. Given that the research question aimed to understand how the president improves the quality of public institutions, the analysis will focus on $Lead_{service}$.

Table 16: Judicial Independence - Leadership Traits of Service (n=6)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{service}$					
(p-value)	1.00077E-12	2.89773E-12	0.133557177	0.015775885	0.006158434
Coefficient	1.20234792	1.123732004	0.22657565	0.338641187	0.376601865
$Exec_{constraints}$					
(p-value)		5.39631E-08	2.00663E-27	0.038687236	1.43871E-05
Coefficient		0.018702256	0.300693835	0.079004243	0.278297317
$Political_{rules}$					
(p-value)			4.60532E-25	2.45781E-34	2.20385E-05
Coefficient			-0.285158385	-0.445574931	-0.252077007
$Political_{rivalry}$					
(p-value)				2.68059E-12	1.11719E-12
Coefficient				0.386168393	0.384186919
$Exec_{selection}$					
(p-value)					0.000114864
Coefficient					-0.399913368
Adjusted R2	0.15717322	0.236122601	0.470200147	0.551267086	0.572414285
Standard error	1.265724753	1.204985833	1.003519988	0.923557785	0.901533157
Significance F	1.00077E-12	3.52479E-18	2.10205E-40	5.76781E-50	3.61848E-52
# of Observations	294	294	294	294	294

Table 17: Judicial Independence - Leadership Traits of Authority (n=6)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{authority}$					
(p-value)	1.00077E-12	2.89773E-12	0.133557177	0.015775885	0.006158434
Coefficient	-1.20234792	-1.123732004	-0.22657565	-0.338641187	-0.376601865
$Exec_{constraints}$					
(p-value)		5.39631E-08	2.00663E-27	0.038687236	1.43871E-05
Coefficient		0.018702256	0.300693835	0.079004243	0.278297317
$Political_{rules}$					
(p-value)			4.60532E-25	2.45781E-34	2.20385E-05
Coefficient			-0.285158385	-0.445574931	-0.252077007
$Political_{rivalry}$					
(p-value)				2.68059E-12	1.11719E-12
Coefficient				0.386168393	0.384186919
$Exec_{selection}$					
(p-value)					0.000114864
Coefficient					-0.399913368
Adjusted R2	0.15717322	0.236122601	0.470200147	0.551267086	0.572414285
Standard error	1.265724753	1.204985833	1.003519988	0.923557785	0.901533157
Significance F	1.00077E-12	3.52479E-18	2.10205E-40	5.76781E-50	3.61848E-52
# of Observations	294	294	294	294	294

The second regression analysis included two additional countries, Kenya and Tanzania, increasing the sample size (n=6) to eight (n=8). As for the first regression analysis presented on Pages 94-97, the same process was used with the larger sample size – a step by step regression analysis as presented in Table 18. Test 1 demonstrated that non-authoritative leadership traits had a positive influence on Judicial Independence, though the model could only explain 14% of the dependent variable, despite its statistical significance. By including the first variable, $Exec_{constraints}$, the influence of the head of state remained with a slight decrease in the coefficient (1.03). $Exec_{constraints}$ had a positive impact on strengthening the quality of the institution of Judicial Independence; however, the model only explained 23% of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. For Test 3, a third variable, $Political_{rules}$, was included in the equation. While the independent variable had a negative influence on $Public_{ins}$, $Lead_{service}$'s coefficient decreased from 1.04 to .40 and R-Squared (R2) increased to 47%. All variables were statistically significant. The fourth test included the independent variable $Political_{rivalry}$. The R-square increased to approximately 52% and all independent variables were statistically independent. Like in Test 3, $Political_{rules}$ had a negative influence on the dependent variable. The final Test 5 results demonstrated that 53% of the dependent variable was explained and all five of the variables were statistically significant with a p-value of .000000. We can reject the null hypothesis that the quality of the judiciary is not influenced by the leadership style of a country's President.

Table 18 and Table 19 provide the summary of the regression model with a sample size of eight for the Institution of Judicial Independence. Like in the original regression, the main difference was the main independent variable, $Lead_{service}$ and $Lead_{authority}$ and highlighted that a president with leadership traits of "Service" had a positive coefficient and positively influence the quality of public institutions while leadership traits of "Authority" had a negative coefficient; hence, negatively impacting the quality of the public institution. Except for the change of coefficient of the main independent variable, the results remained unchanged.

Table 18: Judicial Independence - Leadership traits of Service (n=8)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{authority}$ (p-value)	3.61079E-15	3.31285E-14	0.000650649	3.72055E-05	5.41211E-06
Coefficient	1.128544285	1.037100943	0.404364017	0.475206158	0.518767832
$Exec_{constraints}$ (p-value)		1.94478E-10	7.40E-39	0.000128159	7.18187E-08
Coefficient		0.022511613	0.318269518	0.144079965	0.30892424
$Political_{rules}$ (p-value)			4.05032E-35	5.85617E-37	1.51767E-07
Coefficient			-0.299803998	-0.415421931	-0.262314945
$Political_{rivalry}$ (p-value)				2.97951E-08	1.39116E-09
Coefficient				0.293222596	0.318705286
$Exec_{selection}$ (p-value)					0.000133105
Coefficient					-0.351191636
Adjusted R2	0.144750319	0.227478367	0.477983967	0.516623894	0.533379327
Standard error	1.314238492	1.249059272	1.02676166	0.988030411	0.970755166
Significance F	3.61079E-15	5.82693E-23	4.1844E-55	1.13064E-60	8.72678E-63
# of Observations	392	392	392	392	392

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{authority}$ (p-value)	3.61079E-15	3.31285E-14	0.000650649	3.72055E-05	5.41211E-06
Coefficient	-1.128544285	-1.037100943	-0.404364017	-0.475206158	-0.518767832
$Exec_{constraints}$ (p-value)		1.94478E-10	7.40E-39	0.000128159	7.18187E-08
Coefficient		0.022511613	0.318269518	0.144079965	0.30892424
$Political_{rules}$ (p-value)			4.05032E-35	5.85617E-37	1.51767E-07
Coefficient			-0.299803998	-0.415421931	-0.262314945
$Political_{rivalry}$ (p-value)				2.97951E-08	1.39116E-09
Coefficient				0.293222596	0.318705286
$Exec_{selection}$ (p-value)					0.000133105
Coefficient					-0.351191636
Adjusted R2	0.144750319	0.227478367	0.477983967	0.516623894	0.533379327
Standard error	1.314238492	1.249059272	1.02676166	0.988030411	0.970755166
Significance F	3.61079E-15	5.82693E-23	4.1844E-55	1.13064E-60	8.72678E-63
# of Observations	392	392	392	392	392

By adding two countries, the results are comparable. In Test 5, all independent variables were statically significant. However, R-squared decreased from 57% from the original regression (n=6) to 53% when the sample size increased by adding two countries with comparable income and GDP distribution (n=8). The coefficients were comparable as $Lead_{service}$, $Exec_{constraints}$, and $Political_{rivalry}$ have a positive influence on $Public_{inst}$ while the remaining two independent variables, $Political_{rules}$ and $Exec_{selection}$ have a negative influence on the public institution of Judicial Independence. Moreover, by increasing the sample size, the null hypothesis could be rejected for each of the steps while in the original regression Step 3 could not be rejected given that the p-value for $Lead_{service}$ was above the .05 confidence interval.

Independent Variable 2: *Protection of Property Rights*

Protection of Property Rights was the second dependent and describes the extent to which the properties and any other types of assets are protected by the law. Following the process used to test the null hypothesis of first dependent variable, Judicial Independence, the step-by-step regression analysis was conducted. The result differed as we can see in the test result. Like in the case of the Judicial Independence variable, leadership traits of "Service" had a positive influence on the quality of the institution under review; however, the model explained approximately 25% of the dependent variable in the best-case scenario as shown in Table 20.

From Test 1 to Test 5, the coefficient for $Lead_{service}$, while positive, decreased from .42 to.25 and the p-value remained below the .05 threshold. The independent variable, $Lead_{service}$, had a positive influence on the Protection of Property Rights. However, other independent variables were added to take into account the limits set by the system in which the actor operates, presidential power had a lesser impact on the $Public_{inst}$ "Protection of Property Rights", with the coefficient decreasing from .43 in Test 1 to .25 in Test 5.

Test 5 represents the equation to test the null hypothesis. The $Political_{rules}$ has a p-value of .65 and was not statistically significant in the equation. From a statistical point of the view, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, except for $Political_{rivalry}$, the other four indicators were statistically significant, which lead to conclude that heads of state with leadership traits of "Service" can strengthen the institutions in charge of Protection of Property Rights.

Table 21 provides the summary of the regression model for $Lead_{authority}$ and highlighted that a president with leadership traits of "Authority" had a negative coefficient; hence, negatively impacting the quality of public institutions. Except for the change in the coefficient of the main independent variable, the results remained the same.

Table 20: Protection of Property Rights – Leadership Traits of Service (n=6)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{service}$ (p-value)	3.54405E-05	0.000120178	0.137505407	0.038638507	0.019480424
Coefficient	0.426307985	0.382996907	0.168202675	0.227209637	0.253082211
$Exec_{constraints}$ (p-value)		2.25862E-06	4.1576E-05	0.193154607	0.052473793
Coefficient		0.010303446	0.077816946	-0.038911443	0.096919239
$Political_{rules}$ (p-value)			0.000330006	3.08543E-09	0.65146054
Coefficient			-0.06827	-0.152737377	-0.020856452
$Political_{rivalry}$ (p-value)				1.55706E-06	1.20813E-06
Coefficient				0.203333019	0.201982521
$Exec_{selection}$ (p-value)					0.000834722
Coefficient					-0.272565948
Adjusted R2	0.053748327	0.120842262	0.156233832	0.218399414	0.245553309
Standard error	0.796968616	0.768194673	0.752573538	0.724319751	0.711626592
Significance F	3.54405E-05	2.68479E-09	2.53684E-11	1.60858E-15	3.57244E-17
# of Observations	294	294	294	294	294

Table 21: Protection of Property Rights - Leadership Traits of Authority (n=6)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$\text{Lead}_{\text{authority}}$ (p-value)	3.54405E-05	0.000120178	0.137505407	0.038638507	0.019480424
Coefficient	-0.426307985	-0.382996907	-0.168202675	-0.227209637	-0.253082211
$\text{Exec}_{\text{constraints}}$ (p-value)		2.25862E-06	4.1576E-05	0.193154607	0.052473793
Coefficient		0.010303446	0.077816946	-0.038911443	0.096919239
$\text{Political}_{\text{rules}}$ (p-value)			0.000330006	3.08543E-09	0.65146054
Coefficient			-0.06827	-0.152737377	-0.020856452
$\text{Political}_{\text{rivalry}}$ (p-value)				1.55706E-06	1.20813E-06
Coefficient				0.203333019	0.201982521
$\text{Exec}_{\text{selection}}$ (p-value)					0.000834722
Coefficient					-0.272565948
Adjusted R2	0.053748327	0.120842262	0.156233832	0.218399414	0.245553309
Standard error	0.796968616	0.768194673	0.752573538	0.724319751	0.711626592
Significance F	3.54405E-05	2.68479E-09	2.53684E-11	1.60858E-15	3.57244E-17
# of Observations	294	294	294	294	294

The regression analysis was run again, using the step-by-step approach, with a sample size of eight (n=8). In all the five tests, the leadership traits of "Service" was not statistically significant with p-values above the .05 interval confidence. Moreover, as the number of independent variables increased, $Lead_{service}$ had a negative influence on the Protection of Property Rights. The Adjusted R-squared was approximately 15% for Test 4 and Test 5 and below 15% from Test 1 thru Test 3 and differed from the original regression (n=6), with a sample size of six, the model where approximately 22% of the dependent variable in Test 4 and 25% of the dependent variable in Test 5.

From Test 1 to Test 5, the coefficient for $Lead_{service}$, decreased from .12 to -.03. this and the p-value remained below the .05 threshold (Table 22). Indeed, as other independent variables were added to take into account the limits set by the system in which the actor operates, presidential power had a lesser impact on the $Public_{inst}$ "Protection of Property Rights".

Test 5 represents the equation to test the null hypothesis. The $Political_{rules}$ has a p-value of .75 and was not statistically significant in the equation. The same conclusion is drawn for the independent variable $Exec_{constraints}$ which also had a negative influence on the institution of Protection of Property Rights with a negative coefficient of -.03. The same trend is observed with $Political_{rules}$, with a coefficient of -.17 and $Exec_{selection}$ with a coefficient of -.05. With the exception of $Political_{rules}$ and The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, except for $Political_{rules}$ and $Political_{rules}$, the remaining three indicators were not statistically significant, which leads to conclude that heads of state do not have the influence to strengthen the institutions in charge of Protection of Property Rights. This differs from the results of the original regression where the p-value was within the .05 significance level.

Table 23 provides the summary of the regression model for $Lead_{authority}$ and highlighted that a president with leadership traits of "Authority" had positive coefficients from Test 3 to Test 5; hence, positively impacting the quality of the public institution.

Table 22: Protection of property rights - Leadership Traits of Service (n=8)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{service}$					
(p-value)	0.185187384	0.309359494	0.323757358	0.704734311	0.756010932
Coefficient	0.125711898	0.096002714	-0.098366909	-0.036451571	-0.030062595
$Exec_{constraints}$					
(p-value)		0.003216094	1.69613E-07	0.08616303	0.536709382
Coefficient		0.007313837	0.098167318	-0.054072647	-0.029895748
$Political_{rules}$					
(p-value)			9.95497E-07	5.86268E-14	6.22219E-05
Coefficient			-0.092096395	-0.193145338	-0.170689889
$Political_{rivalry}$					
(p-value)				9.96216E-09	8.36971E-09
Coefficient				0.256273681	0.260011102
$Exec_{selection}$					
(p-value)					0.510634274
Coefficient					-0.05150755
Adjusted R2	0.001944329	0.021488485	0.077733162	0.150688414	0.149443505
Standard error	0.904009056	0.895114038	0.869007839	0.833928703	0.834539659
Significance F	0.185187384	0.005393785	1.60773E-07	8.19047E-14	3.07467E-13
# of Observations	392	392	392	392	392

Table 23: Protection of property rights - Leadership Traits of Authority (n=8)

	Test 1	**Test 2**	**Test 3**	**Test 4**	**Test 5**
$Lead_{authority}$ (p-value)	0.185187384	0.309359494	0.323757358	0.704734311	0.756010932
Coefficient	-0.125711898	-0.096002714	0.098366909	0.036451571	0.030062595
$Exec_{constraints}$ (p-value)		0.003216094	1.69613E-07	0.08616303	0.536709382
Coefficient		0.007313837	0.098167318	-0.054072647	-0.029895748
$Political_{rules}$ (p-value)			9.95497E-07	5.86268E-14	6.22219E-05
Coefficient			-0.092096395	-0.193145338	-0.170689889
$Political_{rivalry}$ (p-value)				9.96216E-09	8.36971E-09
Coefficient				0.256273681	0.260011102
$Exec_{selection}$ (p-value)					0.510634274
Coefficient					-0.05150755
Adjusted R2	0.001944329	0.021488485	0.077733162	0.150688414	0.149443505
Standard error	0.904009056	0.895114038	0.869007839	0.833928703	0.834539659
Significance F	0.185187384	0.005393785	1.60773E-07	8.19047E-14	3.07467E-13
# of Observations	392	392	392	392	392

c. Dependent Variable 3: *Legal Enforcement of Contracts*

The third and final independent variable was Legal Enforcement of Contracts, which measures "the time and money required to collect a debt". Like the other two dependent variables already tested, a step-by-step process to understand the influence of presidential power on the Legal Enforcement of Contracts (Table 24). Test 1 demonstrated a positive influence on the institution under review. This influence is reduced as the system constraints variables such as $Exec_{constraints}$, $Political_{rules}$, $Political_{rivalry}$ and $Exec_{selection}$ are included in the equation. The ultimate equation, Test 5, showed an adjusted R2 of 24%; hence, less than a quarter of the dependent variable was explained by the model. The p-value for $Political_{rivalry}$ is .96 and was not statistically significant. As a result, the null hypothesis was not rejected.

Looking at the remaining four independent variables individually, their p-value is statically significant. $Lead_{service}$ has a positive influence on the quality of Legal Enforcement of Contracts. Table 25 provides the summary of the regression model for $Lead_{authority}$ and highlights that a president with leadership traits of "Authority" had a negative coefficient; hence, negatively impacting the quality of the Legal Enforcement of Contracts. Except for the change in coefficient of the main independent variables, the results remained the same.

Table 24: Legal Enforcement of Contracts - Personality Traits of Service (n=6)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{service}$ (p-value)	1.58014E-06	5.33892E-06	0.001958532	0.002129053	0.000904615
Coefficient	0.736592174	0.64185989	0.506234533	0.506060911	0.541157982
$Exec_{constraints}$ (p-value)		8.22573E-13	0.015699976	0.142390048	0.00091586
Coefficient		0.022536244	0.065165612	0.065509075	0.249768253
$Political_{rules}$ (p-value)			0.110739547	0.251149354	0.049904108
Coefficient			-0.043108102	-0.042859569	0.136041622
$Political_{rivalry}$ (p-value)				0.992291971	0.968249957
Coefficient				-0.000598289	-0.002430289
$Exec_{selection}$ (p-value)					0.002439341
Coefficient					-0.369745456
Adjusted R2	0.072856368	0.220072343	0.22422911	0.221545034	0.243405207
Standard error	1.180054877	1.082320426	1.07943236	1.081298103	1.066007765
Significance F	1.58014E-06	7.26265E-17	1.53201E-16	9.1E-16	5.31584E-17
# of Observations	294	294	294	294	294

Table 25: Legal Enforcement of Contracts - Personality Traits of Authority (n=6)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{authority}$ (p-value)	1.58014E-06	5.33892E-06	0.001958532	0.002129053	0.000904615
Coefficient	-0.736592174	-0.64185989	-0.506234533	-0.506060911	-0.541157982
$Exec_{constraints}$ (p-value)		8.22573E-13	0.015699976	0.142390048	0.00091586
Coefficient		0.022536244	0.065165612	0.065509075	0.249768253
$Political_{rules}$ (p-value)			0.110739547	0.251149354	0.049904108
Coefficient			-0.043108102	-0.042859569	0.136041622
$Political_{rivalry}$ (p-value)				0.992291971	0.968249957
Coefficient				-0.000598289	-0.002430289
$Exec_{selection}$ (p-value)					0.002439341
Coefficient					-0.369745456
Adjusted R2	0.072856368	0.220072343	0.22422911	0.221545034	0.243405207
Standard error	1.180054877	1.082320426	1.07943236	1.081298103	1.066007765
Significance F	1.58014E-06	7.26265E-17	1.53201E-16	9.1E-16	5.31584E-17
# of Observations	294	294	294	294	294

The result for the second regression analysis was run the larger sample size using the step-by-step process was followed to understand the influence of presidential power on the Legal Enforcement of Contracts (Table 26). Test 1 demonstrated a positive influence on the institution under review. This influence is reduced as the system constraints variables such as $Exec_{constraints}$, $Political_{rules}$, $Political_{rivalry}$ and $Exec_{selection}$ are included in the equation though the coefficient improved in Test 3 and Test 5. The ultimate equation, Test 5, showed an adjusted R2 of 26%. The p-value for $Political_{rivalry}$ is .11 and was not statistically significant. As a result, the null hypothesis was not rejected.

Looking at the remaining four independent variables individually, their p-value is statically significant. $Lead_{service}$ has a positive influence on the quality of Legal Enforcement of Contracts. Table 27 provides the summary of the regression model for $Lead_{authority}$ and highlights those presidents with leadership traits of "Authority" had a negative coefficient; hence, negatively impacting the quality of the Legal Enforcement of Contracts. Except for the change in coefficient of the main independent variables, the results remained the same.

Compared to the original regression analysis (n=6), where the only independent variable, $Political_{rivalry}$, was not statistically significant for both regression analysis. Furthermore, the main independent variable had a positive coefficient for each test, the coefficient improved when the sample size was increased. Furthermore, with a larger sample size, R-square improved from 24% to 26% with a slight increase in the Standard Error, from 1.06 in Test 5 of the original regression to 1.32 in Test 5 of the second regression.

Table 26: Legal enforcement of contracts - Personality Traits of Service (n=8)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{service}$ (p-value)	1.97247E-14	1.54222E-13	1.45474E-13	6.8604E-13	1.06215E-13
Coefficient	1.189701996	1.077161025	1.170510178	1.138223955	1.178155826
$Exec_{constraints}$ (p-value)		3.63477E-13	0.573439797	0.205767162	0.005226243
Coefficient		0.027705448	-0.015928405	0.063458281	0.214566804
$Political_{rules}$ (p-value)			0.120342681	0.014459963	0.000414039
Coefficient			0.044230783	0.09692352	0.237272772
$Political_{rivalry}$ (p-value)				0.055854253	0.114644063
Coefficient				-0.133635856	-0.110276528
$Exec_{selection}$ (p-value)					0.009552931
Coefficient					-0.321928375
Adjusted R2	0.137380542	0.245122544	0.247874863	0.253031437	0.264031104
Standard error	1.427583182	1.335457359	1.333020565	1.328443108	1.318625676
Significance F	1.97247E-14	6.51312E-25	1.79429E-24	2.14374E-24	4.99121E-25
# of Observations	392	392	392	392	392

Table 27: Legal enforcement of contracts - Personality Traits of Authority (n=8)

	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
$Lead_{authority}$ (p-value)	1.97247E-14	1.54222E-13	1.45474E-13	6.8604E-13	1.06215E-13
Coefficient	-1.189701996	-1.077161025	-1.170510178	-1.138223955	-1.178155826
$Exec_{constraints}$ (p-value)		3.63477E-13	0.573439797	0.205767162	0.005226243
Coefficient		0.027705448	-0.015928405	0.063458281	0.214566804
$Political_{rules}$ (p-value)			0.120342681	0.014459963	0.000414039
Coefficient			0.044230783	0.09692352	0.237272772
$Political_{rivalry}$ (p-value)				0.055854253	0.114644063
Coefficient				-0.133635856	-0.110276528
$Exec_{selection}$ (p-value)					0.009552931
Coefficient					-0.321928375
Adjusted R2	0.137380542	0.245122544	0.247874863	0.253031437	0.264031104
Standard error	1.427583182	1.335457359	1.333020565	1.328443108	1.318625676
Significance F	1.97247E-14	6.51312E-25	1.79429E-24	2.14374E-24	4.99121E-25
# of Observations	392	392	392	392	392

d. Summary of the findings

      A regression analysis was run for each of the public institutions. The first regression analysis included the original six countries (n=6) selected to test the null hypothesis. A second regression analysis was conducted to understand how the equation would hold as more countries (n=8) were added. The additional two countries were not selected using the same criteria as the original countries. This aimed to understand the consistency of the proposed model as countries with comparable per capita are also part of the landscape in Sub-Saharan Africa.

      In regard to the original sample (n=6), the first dependent variable, Judicial Independence, the null hypothesis was rejected. The multi-regression model established a positive relationship between the influence of the head of state, with leadership traits of "Service" as per Nieburg Value Continuum. The reverse regression analysis showed that the leadership traits of "Authority" had a negative coefficient; hence, a negative influence on the quality of public institutions. However, in both cases, the influence of heads of state decreased as system constraint variables were added to the model, some of them with a positive influence while others had negative coefficients, which can be explained by some of the countries not being free or partly free as the political process and selection is not as open, despite holding elections and the availability of the multi-party system in the country.

      In the second regression analysis (n=8), which added Kenya and Tanzania to the original sample size, the results were comparable for the institutions of Judicial Independence and the Legal Enforcement of Contracts. For the first institution, the increase in the sample size showed that leadership traits of "Service" had a positive influence on the judicial system. In fact, in Test 1 thru Test 5, all independent variables were statistically significant. In Test 5, the coefficient of $Lead_{service}$ increased from .38 in the original regression to .52 in the second regression analysis despite the slight decrease in the Adjusted R-square which remained above 50%.

      For Dependent Variables, "Protection of Property Rights" and "Legal Enforcement of Contracts", the main independent variable, leadership traits of "Service", had a positive value on both institutions, and leadership traits of "Authority" had a negative coefficient in the original regression of n=6. However, in both regressions, the null hypothesis was not rejected as some p-values were not statistically significant.

In the second regression analysis (n=8), the Protection of Property Rights had a different result. The Adjusted R-Square decreased by 10 points and the main independent variable $Lead_{service}$ became negative from Test 3. In the second model, three out of five independent variables were not statistically significant; hence, the null hypothesis was not rejected. In regards to the Legal Enforcement of Contracts, the results were consistent with the first model and leadership traits of "Service" had a positive value on both the institution; however, the adjusted R-square decreased by 10 points to 15%.

VI.   DISCUSSIONS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents the discussions on the regression analysis conducted on each of the dependent variables tested in this research. The second section is a summary of the findings. The final sections present the conclusion and recommendations of the regression analysis.

This research discusses the role of presidential power in strengthening public institutions, using the Nieburg Value Continuum (Figure 2) to categorize the leadership traits of presidents in six countries in Sub-Sahara Africa from 1970 to 2018. Public institutions were defined in a three-tiered structure: Judicial Independence, Protection of Property Rights, and Legal enforcement of Contracts as defined by scholars from the School of Institutional Economics. For each dependent variable, a regression analysis was run to understand the relationship between the influence of presidential leadership in improving the quality of those target institutions. The main independent variable was $Lead_{service}$ [25], the leadership traits of "Service" as defined by Max Weber, James David Barber, and James Macgregor Burns (Nieburg, 1991). Because presidents are actors within an established system of rules (Jochoms and Rutgers, 2005), a set of independent variables were included to measure how the accountability system limits the influence of presidents on the quality of institutions. The findings of the research are discussed for each of the dependent variables and include a comparative analysis of the sample countries selected for the purpose of the research.

For the first dependent variable in the original sample (n=6), Judicial Independence, the null hypothesis was rejected, and it was concluded that leadership traits of "Service" had a positive influence on the quality of the public institution under consideration (personality traits classified as "Authority" had a negative influence on the quality of institutions). This coefficient decreased as the other independent variables were included in the equation (Table 16). Test 1 demonstrated a positive coefficient of 1.20; however, as the number of independent variables increased – independent variables which measured system constraints – the influence of the head of state decreased. By Test 5, the coefficient for the independent variable $Lead_{service}$ were lower to .38 while $exec_{constraints}$ had a positive influence (coefficient = .28) on the quality of institutions because accountability groups did not give a free pass to a president to make decisions. $Political_{rivalry}$ also had a positive influence (coefficient = .39) on the independence of the

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[25] $Lead_{authority}$ is the independent variable for leadership traits of "Authority". This discussion will not go into details as the regression data are the same, with a negative coefficient for $Lead_{authority}$. A summary of the findings is however included to illustrate the negative influence of $Lead_{authority}$ on the quality of public institutions.

judiciary given the participatory political system and the implication of civil society organizations. On the other hand, the regulation around the political process, $Political_{rules}$ and the competitiveness of the selection process, $Exec_{selection}$, negatively impacted the quality of public institutions. This is supported by the yearly reports from the Freedom House, where, except for Botswana, all remaining countries were either "Not Free" or "Partially Free". For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo had a one-party election with 98% support for the one candidate until 1984. Despite embracing democracy, the country has yet to be considered free as the country's leader used internal wars and displacements were used to maintain term limits. Furthermore, "civil liberties – including freedom of expression and association – are repressed, and corruption is systemic throughout the government" (2018 Freedom in the World).

In Figure 24, we noticed an increase in the quality of the Judicial Independence around the time of the democratic movement in the 1990s in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Niger, and Nigeria. The revised constitutions in the four countries aimed to support a new era for stronger institutions based on the fundamental of democratic regimes which included the independence of the judiciary branch. Botswana and Lesotho have been democracies since independence where the head of state is elected by the party holding the majority.

The 1966 Constitution of Botswana, revised in 2016, had a judicial and legal system that included traditional leaders and courts which "supplements" the legal system as overseen by the high courts with civil and criminal jurisdiction. While the President has the authority to appoint the Chief Justice, the other judges are appointed under the authority of a Judicial Service Commission, a possible constraint on the influence of the president on the judicial system. According to the earliest available Freedom of the World report, Botswana was among the few developing countries which were classified as "Free", this classification continued until 2018. Out of 48 years, the country had the leadership of "Service" for 38 years and this positive influence can be pictured in Figure 24. Botswana's first president, Sir Seretse Khama, championed and adopted legal procedures that were impersonal, promoted independent justice, and rationalize standards of administration. According to Acemoglu and Al., "The government sustained the minimal public service structure that it inherited from the British and developed it into a meritocratic, relative non-corrupt and efficient bureaucracy" (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2001). President Masire built on that legacy. The president "strived for social justice, to provide equality of opportunity, and to use persuasion rather than compulsion in order to achieve change

in a democratic constructive way" (Frank, 1981), and established two-terms limits of five years. President Mogoe reinforced the democratic system built by his predecessors by strengthening the rule of law and by improving transparency within the public administration. Unlike his predecessors, Botswana's fourth President, Ian Khama had authoritative tendencies and left a legacy of mismanagement, human rights violations, and the militarization of public services. According to Good (2010), the president's only experience was "restricted to three areas alone: the military; chieftaincy and dynastic politics; and state power, briefly at the highest level.". This impact of his authoritative tendencies negatively impacted the quality of Judicial Independence. During his tenure, the scoring of Judicial Independence fell below 6, reaching as low as 5.68, .35 points below 6.03 in 1970. In the case of Botswana, Figure 17 supports the rejection of the null hypothesis. As shown visually, the judiciary institution sustained improvement with presidential leadership traits of "Service". Under the presidency of Ian Khama, the rating for Judicial Independence decreased to an all-time low.

Lesotho, a neighboring country of Botswana, had similarities in the governance system – the country has a parliamentary regime. However, the Judicial Independence had a lesser score, from 4.91 in 1970 to 4.85 in 2018. The reason might be that the country did not enjoy the same political stability, with Prime Ministers changing 9 times in 48 years (Table 14) and witnessing three military coups (1970, 1986, and 1991). All Prime Ministers, except one, were categorized as having "Authority" traits (Table 9). From the first PM, Leabua Jonathan, who refused to concede power, despite losing the elections in 1970, to the last PM, Tom Thabane who suspended the constitution when things did not go his way, it was a challenge for Lesotho to improve Judicial Independence over the 48-year period. This was supported by the Freedom of the World Reports which described Lesotho as a partially free country for most of the period under review, with civil liberty restrictions and arrestation of political leaders. Unlike Botswana, the traditional king appoints the Chief Justice in consultation with the Prime Minister, who is elected by the Parliament, yet the judiciary system scored lower. The dependent variable, Judicial Independence, could only be explained for 58% of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. In the case of Lesotho, the evolution of the institution sustained small increases from 1970 to 2004 before witnessing a sharp decrease from a rating of 5.32 to 4.73 in 2009, under the leadership of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili. Figure 26 does not visually show the negative relationship between "Authoritative" leadership traits and Judicial Independence for most of the

period. Indeed, the reverse coding provided the same coefficient for the $Lead_{authority}$ as the main independent variable; however, the coefficient is negative, which can be interpreted that the "Authoritative" style of leadership of presidents had a negative impact on the quality of the public institutions as defined in the realm of this research. For the most part, Lesotho's Prime Ministers did not have "Strong personalities" because they did not have the expected ethical and integrity behaviors that Yeboah-Assiamah (2016) documented in his research, but the quality of Judicial Independence remained stable and was the second highest rated after Botswana (Figure 25).

In Central Africa, both the Democratic Republic of Congo and Gabon had low scores for the institution of Judicial Independence with DRC having an average score of 2 out of 10 points. This scoring provided a bleak outlook and contradicted the country's constitution, which states that the legislative branch of the government is independent and free of the influence of the executive branch. Furthermore, the Freedom of the World Reports noted that the DRC was not considered a free country from 1972, the earliest data available to 2018. The country only had three presidents in 48 years – the first two were not democratically elected and reached the presidency because of a military coup while the last president "inherited" the position after the untimely death of his father[26]. In the Nieburg Value Continuum, they all fell under "Authority" and were characterized as dictators, intransigent, repressive, and in favor of nepotism/clientelism. Contrary to the assumption forth by Acemoglu (2015), the Presidents of the Democratic Republic of Congo had minimum system constraints given their dictatorial tendencies.

In the late 1980s, with the rise of democratic movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, the score slightly increased for Judicial Independence and continued to do so as constitutions were revised as a first step to committing to a democratic society and allowed for the creation of hundreds of political parties. The Judicial Independence in the Democratic Republic of Congo benefited from the democratic movement as shown by the rating improvement, from 1.72 in 1988 to 2.68 in 2018. However, President Mobutu was an anti-institutionalist as he feared that effective bureaucracy would threaten his tenure. In fact, Mobutu "was legally able to legislate by decree" (McCormick, 1994) and he promoted a regime of nepotism and clientelism to the point where judges and prosecutors were perceived as corrupt "By the end of the Mobutu regime, profound weakness in

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[26] Joseph Kabila ultimately held the election in 2006, 5 years after holding the office of the Presidency.

Figure 25: The Institution of Judicial Independence - An overview by Country (n=6)

Source: Economic Freedom of World (2020)

the central state had created regional opportunities for predation" (Schatzberg, 2012). When Desire Kabila took office, he promised to hold an election; however, he ruled by decree and established a constitutional order granting him almost absolute power. According to the 2001 Freedom House report for the country, "A decree provides for the independence of the judiciary, but in practice, it is subject to corruption and manipulation". The president may dismiss magistrates at will. Courts are grossly ineffective in protecting constitutional rights, and security forces and government officials act with impunity. The civil judiciary is largely dysfunctional". When Joseph Kabila took office, the Judicial Independence improved slightly, linked mainly to the hope of holding democratic elections. However, the 3rd year into his presidency, "Despite guarantees of independence, in practice the judiciary was subject to corruption and manipulation[27]". After being elected in 2006 and reelected in 2011, Judicial Independence rating remained low: "Kabila appoints members of the judiciary, which remains subject to corruption and political manipulation. Courts are concentrated in urban areas, and most of the country relies on customary courts. Military courts are used often, even in civilian cases, and are subject to interference from high-ranking military personnel. The judiciary is susceptible to bias against opposition party members and civil society[28]".

The context in Gabon was similar, with only two presidents in the 48-year period, both with authoritative tendencies. Under Omar Bongo, the constitution did not provide the texts to promote oversight and constrain the influence of presidential power. In fact, the constitution stated that having more than one political party was a crime. Regarding Judicial Independence, "Criminal cases are generally handled fairly by the courts, but the government can interfere in security cases, and suspects in such cases can be held indefinitely without charge[29]". The country was not considered "Free" until 1990 when having more than one political party was no longer a crime; however, the judicial system was controlled by the executive branch: "The judiciary is not independent. However, rights to legal counsel and a public criminal trial are generally respected. Judges may deliver summary verdicts, and torture is sometimes used to produce confessions[30]." Finally, despite the election and reelection of Ali Bongo, Freedom House reported a score of 0 out of 4 on the Rule of Law in Gabon in 2018 because the President, thru his cabinet, has the power

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[27] 2004 Freedom of the World Report
[28] 2018 Freedom of the World Report
[29] 1989-1990 Freedom of the World Report
[30] 2009 Freedom of the World Report

to appoint and dismiss judges and the potential constitutional amendments of 2017 considered to increase the presidential control of the judicial system. Moreover, President Bongo continued to maintain control over the economic life of his country thanks to the use of patronage and restriction on the opposition's ability to limit executive power.

In the case of Central Africa, where the presidents in DRC and Gabon had authoritative traits as defined by Nieburg Value Continuum, Judicial Independence was ranked low, with an average of 2-3 out of 10. Both countries saw an improved scoring because of the democratic movement in the region, which "forced" the presidents to follow suit to maintain power; however, they were not inclusive societies; hence the emphasis is not put on good institutions (Acemoglu, 2015)

In West Africa, Niger and Nigeria had similarities in terms of political outlook and instability – over the course of 48, Niger had 9 presidents while Nigeria had 13. Both countries witnessed military coups and disruptions which made the quality of Judicial Independence fluctuate during the period. In Figure 25, trends in Niger and Nigeria have similarities – Judicial Independence improved when the leadership trait was "Service". On the other hand, the quality of institutions decreased when the head of state had authoritative tendencies.

According to World Freedom data, Niger was not free until the year 2000 and was categorized as "partially free" as of 2018. Regarding the judicial system, the constitution states that the judiciary is independent; however, in practice, this did not hold. The constitution was suspended during transition periods, after military coups, where special courts handled civil matters and/or the interference of the executive or other forces in judicial proceedings and/or decisions. The lack of independence of the courts and overall judicial institution has been documented yearly by the Freedom House. In neighboring Nigeria, during the 48-year period, there were 6 military regimes, of which only one president had leadership traits of "Service" per the Nieburg's rating. President Obasanjo organized peaceful elections in 1979 and was democratically elected in1999. Like Niger, the independence of the judiciary system is enshrined in the constitution; however, there is some interference – "The judiciary has achieved some degree of independence and professionalism in practice, but political interference, corruption, and a lack of funding, equipment, and training remain important problems"[31].

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[31] 2018 Freedom of the Word report

In comparing the country in each region – Central, Southern, and Western Africa, the constitutions of the six countries (n=6) enshrined the institution of Judicial Independence. However, to some degree, there were interferences not only from the executive but also from other pockets of power because of the corruption level in the country. Botswana remained on top of the pack, with an average score of 6 out of 10, though the score decreased below 6 under an authoritative regime where there was an attempt to militarize public services. In all countries, Presidents were either in the position to directly appoint the Attorney General and/or the highest-ranking judge in the country or were part of the appointment process (Lesotho). Except for Botswana, the remaining countries were not entirely free, which meant that the executive had more influence on the quality of the Judicial Independence, and the weight seemed to increase when corruption[32] was recurrent within the public sector and where nepotism/clientelism was reported.

When the original sample size (n = 6) was extended to include Kenya and Tanzania (n=8), selected for being comparable in economic terms, to test the consistency of the model, the null hypothesis was rejected and supported the assumption that presidents have an influence on the independent variable Judicial Independence. For Kenya and Tanzania, the rating of the judicial system improved overtime (Figure 26).

With a rating of 5.1 in 1970, Kenya witnessed an improved judicial system reaching its peak in 2006 with a score of 8.35. Out of four presidents in Kenya, only president Kibaki was ranked with leadership traits of service. While the four had authoritative tendencies, they made valuable contributions to the development of their country. Jomo Kenyatta was an emblematic figure and the father of independence of the country; however, the country was "partially free" according to the Freedom of the World Reports from 1973 to 1986, and elitism was reported by Gikandi (2000) that Kenyatta's period "was characterized by one-party dictatorship, cronyism and the politicizing of ethnicity". His authoritarian legacy continued with his successor who was his Vice President. While Kenya introduced multipartyism under President Moi's regime, this was not without the pressure from the international community, including the United States which withheld aid until the country become a democracy. According to the 1982-83 Freedom of the World

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[32] Data for corruption, including nepotism and clientelism, was not in included in the analysis given the lack of data availability for the period under review.

Figure 26: The Evolution of Judicial Independence in Kenya and Tanzania

Source: Economic Freedom of World (2020)

Report, President Moi banned multiparty in the countries. The rating of Judicial Independence decreased during the period and only began to increase from early 1990 when the country allowed political competition leading to the first multiparty elections in 1992. During the regime of President Kibaki, the dependent variable, Judicial Independence continued to improve, scoring up to 8.35 out of 10 in 2006 before decreasing thereafter. The decrease can be attributed to the heightened corruption in the country which began during Kenyatta's presidency and lingered during the period under review[33]. According to Murunga (2006), the Kibaki regime left Kenyans disappointed two years after the start of his presidency, unable to deliver the promises made during his campaign in combatting corruption. However, he was able to draft a new constitution in 2010 which enhanced the independence of the judiciary through the institution remained inefficient because of corruption in the courts and law enforcement[34]. The rating of Judicial Independence continued to decrease during Uhuru Kenyatta's presidential terms, not only plagued by corruption.

On the other hand, Tanzania had five presidents, four of whom were categorized with leadership traits of "service" using the Neustadt Value Continuum. Tanzania did not however enjoy the increase in rating as did its neighboring country of Kenya with the rating decreasing from 4.88 in 1970 to 4.45 in 2018. According to the Freedom of the World reports, Tanzania, labelled as socialist, was not a free country in 1993. The first president and father of independence of Tanzania, Nyerere said "where there is one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be when you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community!" (IDASA's democracy index edited by Misra-Dexter and Al, 2010). Nyerere was an equalitarian who believed in fairness and the welfare of the community. His socialist policies did not work, plunging the country into economic disarray as Nyerere believed that self-reliance cannot be achieved through development aids – his policies and those of his party were cemented in the 1967 Arusha Declaration. It was under President Mwinyi that trade was liberalized, and opposition parties became legal to conduct their political activities. Presidents Mkapa and Kiwete continued to liberalize trade, privatize state-owned enterprises, and most importantly promote an inclusive justice system. However, like

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[33] According to Transparency International Index, https://www.transparency.org/en, Kenya consistently ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world, ranking 144 out of 159 in 2005, 154 out of 178 in 2010, 139 out of 167 in 2015 and 144 out of 180 in 2018.
[34] Freedom House 2014-2018 reports.

Kenya, Tanzania was faced with rampant corruption which started under the socialist policy of Nyerere which created scarcity in the country.

In both countries, the constitutions give the president the power to appoint the Chief of Justice; hence, providing them with the ability to influence the quality of the public institution of Judicial independence though their power is limited by system constraints as shown by the step-by-step process and other factors such as policies implemented or corruption which may impede efforts for an independent judiciary.

The second institution tested was the Protection of Property Rights. In the five tests conducted using data from the original sample (N = 6), the $Lead_{service}$ was statistically significant, except in Test 3 where the p=.137505. In Test 5, the p-values for $Political_{rules}$ was not statistically significant with a value of p=.65. The null hypothesis was not rejected with the conclusion that the Protection of Property rights is not influenced by the combination of independent variables selected.

As per the regression analysis (n=6), presidents have an influence on the protection of property rights. In that the p-value for $Lead_{service}$ was statistically significant (p-value = .02). The influence could be explained by the fact that the judiciary is involved when it comes to property rights. According to the constitutions of the sample countries, citizens have the right to own properties which are protected by the legal system of the country. As such the Chief Justice or General Attorney is responsible for overseeing the decision of the courts regarding the subject of property rights, including in some countries, protection from expropriation.

In Botswana, the Constitution states "securing to any person having an interest in or right over the property a right of access to the High Court, either directly or on appeal from any other authority, for the determination of his or her interest or right, the legality of the taking of possession or acquisition of the property, interest or right, and the amount of any compensation to which he or she is entitled, and for the purpose of obtaining prompt payment of that compensation[35]". In pre-colonial Botswana, the chief had the authority to distribute land, enforce contracts, and oversee the traditional justice system within their chiefdom. This power was gradually taken away and absorbed by the administration under the authority of President Khama who foresaw the potential of conflicts as diamonds were being discovered in the country. Khama utilized the information he

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[35] www.constitutionproject.org – Botswana 1966 Constitution with 2005 amendments

had regarding the value of diamonds to proactively influence the existing institutional structure of property rights and rule of law. He exploited his legitimate traditional role, as per the Tswana's culture of chiefdom, to gradually modernize the traditional system. As a result, chiefs gradually lost their power to execute sentences or decisions where legal systems were established. "Seretse Khama ensured that the House of Chiefs became a talking shop that gave the chiefs no real power over legislation …. BDP passed legislation that progressively stripped the chiefs of their residual powers, for example, over the allocation of land" (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2012). According to Figure 16, while Judicial Independence increased from 1995 to 2002 the Protection of Property Rights decreased. The most plausible explanation is the aspect of corruption. As per the 2021 Economic Freedom Index[36], "Botswana remains Africa's least corrupt country, ranking among the 40th[37] least corrupt countries in the world, but officials tasked with enforcing anticorruption statutes lack adequate training and resources". When comparing the political inclusiveness and democracy of Botswana and Singapore, You (2016) argued that "Private property rights is a critical element of growth and development"; however, Botswana remained a patrimonial society where "corruption and patrimonial practices do still exist and when they are evident, they tend to be found at the highest levels of politics, and it's worsening day by day" (You, 2016).

Property rights are also enshrined in Lesotho constitution, where "No property, movable or immovable, shall be taken possession of compulsorily, and no interest in or right over any such property shall be compulsorily acquired[38]" and citizens have access to the courts regarding the legality of their ownership. From 1996, the rating fell below 6 and never fully recovered. The problem might be linked to the enforcement of the protection of property laws: "Property rights are protected by law, but enforcement is inconsistent. Expropriation is unlikely. The judiciary is relatively independent but politicized, inefficient, slow, and chronically underfunded. Official corruption and impunity remain problems in all sectors of government and public services[39]". Despite the legal framework around property rights, Lesotho also has a customary land tenure system, which is governed by traditional rules and administered by traditional community leaders

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[36] https://www.heritage.org/index/country/botswana
[37] According to Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en, Botswana ranked 32nd out of 159 countries in 2005, 33rd out of 178 in 2010, 29th out 167 in 2015 and 35th out of 179 in 2020
[38] www.constitutionproject.org – Lesotho Constitution
[39] https://www.heritage.org/index/country/lesotho

such as chiefs. As reported by the Food and Agriculture organization, "Commoners have a right of access and land use, provided that the land is used under conditions and for purposes for which it was granted. All adult married males are entitled to the allocation of land for residential or agricultural purposes. An allottee does not have rights of ownership over the land. He has a right over the land as long as he occupies or works it and he continues to owe his allegiance to the chief."[40] As a result, customary land rights also reduce the impact of presidential power in strengthening the institution of property rights. While the p-value of $Lead_{service}$ is statically significant, the adjusted R2 was only 24.55%, as such local and customary practices might explain in part the other influences on property rights in individual countries.

The protection of property rights is also echoed in the constitutions of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Niger, and Nigeria. Like in Botswana and Lesotho, the court systems ensure of enforcement of the law; however, the judiciary was weak. In the Central African countries selected, as categorized in the Nieburg Value Continuum, no president was classified in "Service". They were all authoritarians, who governed by decrees and favored nepotism, weakening the state's institutional capacity. They also did not promote an inclusive society as the power was centered at their level, even after constitutions were amended to promote a democratic system of governance. According to the Freedom of the Word reports from 2009 – 2018, women have no or limited property rights in Gabon. In the case of Congo, Acemoglu & Al. stated "The modern Democratic Republic of Congo remains poor because its citizens still lack the economic institutions that create the basic incentives that make a society prosperous. It is not geography, culture, or the ignorance of its citizens or politicians that keep the Congo poor, but its extractive economic institutions. These are still in place after all these centuries because political power continues to be narrowly concentrated in the hands of an elite who have little incentives to enforce secure property rights for the people, to provide the basic public services that would improve the quality of life, or to encourage economic progress" (Acemoglu & Al., 2012, p.105).

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[40] https://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/country-profiles/countries-list/land-tenure-and-related-institutions/en/?country_iso3=LSO

Figure 27: The Institutions of Protection of Property Rights - An Overview by Country (n=8)

Source: Economic Freedom of World (2020)

The inclusion of Kenya and Tanzania did not improve the outcome. In fact, it worsened as the p-value for the independent variable $Lead_{service}$ was not statistically significant. Like in other countries, the Protection of Property Rights was both constitutions. However, as discussed on Pages 124-125, corruption is rampant in both Kenya and Tanzania. In the June 2015 issue of Adili[41], there was a focus on corruption and property rights in Kenya with confirmed the correlation between the two – "The land sector has consistently been ranked as one of the most bribery sectors in Kenya". Moreover, countries like Kenya recognized the necessity to legalized customary laws which were included in the 2010 Constitution. In their 2021 September, 2021 Rights and Resources Initiatives reported that[42] "The 2010 constitution, which recognized the legitimacy of customary land tenure, was a critical step forward in instituting reforms in land governance, land use, land ownership, and customary land tenure in Kenya. The Forest Management and Conservation Act of 2014 built on the constitution's recognition of customary tenure rights, including provisions for local communities to co-manage forest lands alongside the Kenya Forest Service, withdraw forest products, and establish plantation forests. Previously, these activities were considered illegal. The Community Land Act (CLA) of 2016 also helped further secure community land rights and resolve historical injustices related to land."

Tanzania has comparable policies in regard to customary land tenure with the following legal framework: "The Village Land Act states that 'any rule of customary land and any decision taken in respect of land held under customary tenure, whether in respect of land held individually or communally, shall have regard to the customs, traditions, and practices of the community concerned' (URT 1999b, Section 20, 2). The Act empowers village councils and village assemblies to deal with administrative and management issues regarding village land. This includes the allocation of land to villagers and entering into joint ventures with investors through leases, using a type of lease called a 'customary lease', the 'mode of creation and incidents of which including its termination is governed by customary law' (URT 1999b, sections 7-21)" (Sull, 2017). However, the 1967 Land Acquisition Act provides prerogatives to the President to dispose of land when they are deemed of public necessity[43] and those discretionary privileges are still in effect.

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[41] https://tikenya.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/adili-issue-152-corruption-and-land-governance-in-kenya.pdf
[42] https://rightsandresources.org/wp-content/uploads/Summary-of-RRI-Analyses_Kenya_EN.pdf
[43] The Land Acquisition Act, 1967

In summary, presidents do have an influence on the decision as reflected by the regression analysis where the null hypothesis was not rejected but the p-value was significant in the regression n=6. Their influence on the institution of the Protection of Property Rights is through the quality of the judiciary system. Indeed, Presidents are directly involved in selecting attorney generals, judges, and other relevant stakeholders of the judicial system – the quality and skillsets of those selected are essential for an independent judicial system which in turn provides protection to the institution of Property Rights. With the addition of Tanzania and Kenya, another factor that must take into consideration is corruption as it can hinder the influence of presidential power in strengthening the institution of the Protection of Private Property Rights.

The third institution tested was the Legal Enforcement of Contracts using the step-by-step regression model. For the original regression (n=6), the Adjusted R2 is 24%; hence, the model can only explain 24% of the dependent variable. Test 5, which represented the equation being tested, the null hypothesis was tested. The main independent variable, $Lead_{service}$ had a positive coefficient and the p-value was statistically significant. The null hypothesis could not be rejected because $Poltical_{rivalry}$ was not statically significant (p-value = .97) (Table 16). Figure 12 provides an image of how this dependent variable changed over the period of 48 years. The Legal Enforcement of Contracts seemed flat in most countries, especially in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Lesotho, and Niger. Since 2014, there is an improvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, and Nigeria.

By increasing the sample size to eight countries (n=8), Legal Enforcement of Contracts improved slightly as the Adjusted R2 increased from 24% to 26%. $Lead_{service}$ remained statistically significant and while the null hypothesis could not be rejected, the p-value of $Poltical_{rivalry}$ improved from .96 to .11. As shown in Figure 27, Tanzania had the highest rating when it came to the $Public_{inst}$ under review, though the rating began to decrease from 2000, reaching its lowest point at 4.98 in 2012 before increasing to 5.78 in 2015.

Like in the case of the Protection of Property Rights, the quality of the institution "Legal Enforcement of Contracts" is dependent on the judicial system of the country. As explained in the analysis of the 2nd dependent variable, and to minimize redundancy, the judicial system in most countries is weak, unreliable, and corrupt. To improve the institutions "Protection of Property Rights" and "Legal Enforcement of Contracts", the justice system must be independent of the

Figure 28: The Institution of Legal Enforcement of Contracts - An Overview by Country (n=8)

Source: Economic Freedom of World (2020)

executive and other powerful forces, have access to human and financial resources, and make appointments on the basis of qualification, with no reprisals for decisions made within the law.

Selected independent variables aimed to demonstrate the limitation of presidential power on the strengthening of the public institutions. Because presidents are part of a system of rules, their powers are restricted by a set of rules and regulations as defined by the constitution and/or laws. However, the regression analysis demonstrated a negative relationship between a couple of independent variables and the dependent variable. This was the case for Judicial Independence and Protection of Property Rights where the analysis showed a negative relationship between the independent variables $Political_{rules}$ and $Political_{rivalry}$ and the dependent variable $Public_{inst}$. One would assume that a system of rules in the political process, as well as competition in the political area, would have a positive influence on strengthening $Public_{inst}$; however, both the independent variables, $Political_{rules}$ and $Exec_{constraints}$ both had negative coefficients. The negative influence of the two variables can be explained with the fact that five out of six countries were not perceived as full democracies. Power was centralized by presidents and/or the majority political alliance in power. $Political_{rules}$ are either restricted[44] or sectarian[45]. Moreover, the data showed that $Exec_{constraints}$ rating may conflict with available reports on the status of Polity5 in the sample population. The negative relationship between $Public_{inst}$, $Political_{rules}$ and $Political_{rivalry}$, did not change when Kenya and Tanzania were added to the sample size. In both countries, the power is centered within the same political alliance. In Tanzania, the same party remained in power since its independence, despite the options brought by the democratic system where multi political parties were allowed to compete in the political arena. $Political_{rules}$ were restricted until 1991 and became sectarian after the country welcomed democratic institutions. Kenya followed the same trend and went from a restricted political system to a sectarian one in the 1990s. In the 2000s, $Political_{rules}$ were rated as relatively stable with political parties competing at the national stage.

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[44] Polity5 definition of Restricted political regulations: "Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism, but significant groups/issues/types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process".

[45] Polity5 definition of Sectarian political regulations: "when identity group secures central power it favors groups members in central allocation and restricts competing groups political activities, until it is displaced in turn. Political groups are based on restrictive membership and significant portion of the population has been historically excluded"

The Democratic Republic of Congo had a substantial limitation on the executive as a result of strong legislative and/or accountability groups during the 2006-2015 period. This conflicts with information from the Freedom of the World report from 2006, where the country was "Not Free". While political rights rating improved from 2005 to 2006 due to holding successful elections, the reports highlighted that "great power was vested in the presidency" and negotiation with small parties provided a majority to the presidential coalition; hence, obtaining a majority in the legislature and securing the nomination of the Prime Minister by the president. As per Table 7, President Joseph Kabila was classified as authoritative with repressive tendencies, and in 2016, he could not guarantee a smooth transition in power. His regime was known for intimidating and/or repressing the opposition. As such, $Exec_{constraints}$, the same anomaly with a rating of 5, "substantial limitation on executive authority", conflicts with $Political_{rules}$ of a rating of 3, "Sectarian", where members of the group in power have greater resource allocation and have the ability to restrict the opposition's political participation (Figure 13). When the election did not take place in 2016 as scheduled, $Exec_{constraints}$ rating decreased sharply from 5 to 3 while $Exec_{selection}$ went from a rating of 2, where "Dual executives in which one is chosen by hereditary succession, the other by competitive election." to a rating of 1 "Chief executives are determined by hereditary succession, designation, or by a combination of both. Ex. Rigged /unopposed elections; repeated replacements of presidents before their terms; recurrent military selection of civilian executives, selection within an institutionalized single party; recurrent incumbent selection of successors; repeated election boycotts by the major opposition parties". Between 1992 and 2005, no rating was assigned because a transitional regime was in place after the military coup[46].

The data from Gabon presented inconsistencies between 2009-2018 where $Exec_{constraints}$ was between moderate to substantial limitation on the executive authority while $Political_{rules}$ and $Political_{rivalry}$ favored group members of political coalitions to the detriment of the greater good. According to the Freedom of the World Reports for the same period, Gabon was not a free country, the judiciary was not independent and 80% of the political parties were part of the ruling coalition. Furthermore, the presidency of Ali Bongo seemed hereditary given his father's strong hand in the political life of Gabon for more than four decades, with unlimited authority.

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[46] In Polity5, Transitional regime are scored as -77 and -88. For the purpose of the graph, the scoring of -1 was assigned for transition periods.

Looking beyond the inconsistencies, the data showed that changes in the quality of institutions, whether positive or negative, were small and incremental for the most part. This can be explained by the lag between a decision made by a president and its implementation. Over time, the incremental changes can be explained by the complementarity of the Agency Theory and the Structuration Theory of Giddens, where agents, in this instance heads of state, operate in a system of existing regulations and processes, which cannot change overnight, regardless of the personality traits of the heads of state. This is also supported by the very definition of institutions. According to Veblen, an institution is "a social organization which, through the operation of tradition customs or legal constraints, tends to create durable and routine patterns of behaviors" (Luz & Fernandez, 2018). Indeed, routines are anchored in the manner individuals live together, including in dictatorial regimes, influenced by historical norms from a legal and societal point of view. The behaviors have helped in the construction of acceptable institutional orders. According to Hodgson (2006), "any single individual is born into a pre-existing institutional world which confronts him or her with its rules and norms". Beyond, legal rules to regulate a presidency, and societal norms, which were not explored in this research, institutional structures can limit the president's influence or expand it in countries where heads of state of unlimited authority or limited oversight from accountability groups. Except in Botswana, $Political_{rules}$ are either restricted[47] or sectarian[48], with power being centralized by presidents and/or the political alliance in power, a structure that presidents were able to utilize to push forth their agendas[49] with minimal limitations.

Presidents are agents of their population. As such, they take decisions on behalf of those same individuals (principals) who selected them either thru a democratic process or as a hereditary ascension. As with any agent, there is asymmetric information that does not allow for the principle to make the agent more accountable to the population he serves. An example is endemic corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo, promoted under the Mobutu regime but continued throughout the Kabila regime and beyond. The regime of Omar Bongo and his successor, Ali

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[47] Polity5 definition of Restricted political regulations: "Some organized political participation is permitted without intense factionalism, but significant groups/issues/types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process".

[48] Polity5 definition of Sectarian political regulations: "when identity group secures central power it favors groups members in central allocation and restricts competing groups political activities, until it is displaced in turn. Political groups are based on restrictive membership and significant portion of the population has been historically excluded"

[49] Countries with unlimited executive authority, the executive priorities were not necessarily to strengthen public institutions but their stronghold with nepotism recruitment process as documented when a head of state had authoritative tendencies.

Bongo has also been plagued by corruption, nepotism, and a life of luxury for a few. Executive budgets, citizen budgets, financial reports, and external audit reports were only introduced in the early 2000s[50], making it impossible for citizens to hold their agents accountable. Furthermore, heads of state operate in the realm of an existing structure which they can only influence at a slower pace. This held true where corruption and nepotism were reported under the regime of Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya and continued with his successors.

 As per the statistical analysis, the leadership traits of presidents can have an influence on the quality of institutions. The p-value for the three institutions tested was statistically significant. As per Figure 24, Judicial Independence in Botswana began with an average rating of 6 in 1970, which grew in small increment annually with a pick to 6.85 in 2001. The trend was reversed from 2014 with a score of 6.23 but still higher than the starting level of 6.03 in 1970. In 2015, Judicial Independence had a score of 5.94, reaching 5.77 in 2018. The decrease in the quality of the Judicial Independence began approximately 7 years after President Ian Khama came into power. He was known for being an authoritarian who used direct sanctions to reprimand dissidents. Despite his authoritative tendencies, he could not drastically reduce the quality of the judiciary because of the existing system of governance created and consolidated over time by his predecessors. Moreover, scholars documented the quality of institutions in Botswana and argued that pre-colonial institutions, almost untouched by the British, centered around the leadership of established chiefdoms. This systemic democracy was further strengthened by laws and regulations which enabled political competition in the country. As per Polity5, $Exec_{constraints}$ increased from a 5 rating[51] in 1970 to 7 where "accountability groups have effective authority equal to a greater authority than the executive in most areas of activity". Laws were decided collectively, and the appointments were based on the culture of meritocracy, which President Ian Khama tried to change structurally by promoting a culture of patronage where the best people were not recruited to do the

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[50] https://internationalbudget.org/publications/citizens-budgets/#

[51] Polity5 definition: "Substantial limitation on executive authority by legislature or party council, accountability groups. The executive group has more effective authority than any accountability group is subject to substantial constraints. Legislature can modify or defeats executive proposal for action. Legislature can refuse funds to the executive. Accountability groups make important appointments to admin posts. Legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country."

Figure 29: The Democratic Republic of Congo Polity5 Trends

Source: Center for Systemic Peace (Polity5) (2018)

job and where there was a militarization of public service. As in Botswana, the trends in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Lesotho, Niger, and Nigeria, the $Public_{inst}$ of Judicial Independence, changed in small increments, and for the most part, remained within 1 point of the scoring assigned in 1970. The same analysis held true for Tanzania. In the case of Kenya, there were substantial fluctuations in the rating, from 5.14 in 1970, Judicial Independence's rating decreased to 3.64 in 1980, its lowest point, before reaching 8.35 in 2006.

For the $Public_{inst}$ of Protection of Property Rights (Figure 27), the trends in each country were relatively stable for the most part. There were also periods of sharp increase and/or decrease in the scoring. In Lesotho, Protection of Property Rights was scored at 6.31 from 1970 to 1994; however, the scoring decreased to 5.08, more than 1 point from 1995, reaching its lowest point in 4.74 in 2006, before closing with a rating of 5.02 in 2018. The change in scoring in 1995 can be attributed to a disruption to the system as documented by the sustained political instability since the elections held in 1993, followed by a military and monarchy hold-up of the democratic process. The 1995-1996 Freedom of the World Report also explored women's rights to own property: "The 1993 constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, but customary practices and laws still restrict women's rights in several areas, including contracts, property rights, and inheritance. Legally, a woman is considered a minor as long as her husband is alive." This supports the complementarity of the Agency Theory and the Structuration Theory as existing systems can only be slowly changed in the long term. The role of the head of state should aim to draft and implement policies that will positively impact the quality of the institutions he leads during his term.

Another country with a significant drop in the ranking of the Protection of Property Rights was Nigeria which also saw a drop of over 1 point, from 5.55 in 1989 to 4.03 in 1990. The decline continued until 2001 to 3.76 before increasing to 4.6 in 2018. During the late 1980s, the regime of Babandiga was contested, elections were delayed and economic contractions, because of the International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs, might be the reason for a decrease in the quality of the protection of property rights. Like in Lesotho, a systemic shock can have a negative impact on institutions as well as the decentralized role of the state in the management of property rights as bestowed on Governors. The Land Use Act 1978[52], Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004- the Act to standardize land administration in Nigeria, argue that "all lands comprised

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[52] https://www.globalpropertyguide.com/Africa/Nigeria/property-rights-index
https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/country/nigeria

in the territory of each state in the Federation are vested in the Governor of that State and such land shall be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with the provisions of the Act[53]". The Act demonstrates that despite the power bestowed to presidents in Nigeria, the system has rules and regulations which limit the role of the head of state in the quality of public institutions, especially in the case of Nigeria where Governors are elected.

Finally, for the $Public_{inst}$ of Legal Enforcement of Contracts, the changes were also incremental. Nigeria witnessed the biggest drop in 1989 which may be linked to the political disruption and other factors as listed in the early section of the paragraph. The political disruption and economic compression affected the quality.

The use of the complementarity of both the Agency Theory and the Theory of Structuration aimed to demonstrate that presidential power, as defined in this research, has its limitation. Beyond the personality traits which influence the decision-making process of an agent, heads of state must work within a system that regulates the very public institutions it oversees. As per the discussion on pages 135 - 136, the influence of presidential power is incremental since there is a lag between policy adoption and implementation, and behavioral change as seen in the case of Botswana can be slow to implement. Furthermore, there are laws that delegate some of the prerogatives of a head of state to other elected officials as seen in Nigeria where land tenure is overseen by governors, as well as customary laws around land tenure as in the case of Lesotho. The discussion showed that the leadership traits of presidents can partly explain the quality of public institutions, but they are not the only elements to consider. It is not only important to enact laws, institutionalize rules and procedures, and strengthen the quality of public institutions but also to ensure the application of the laws. In the sample countries (N = 6), the case of corruption, nepotism, patronage, and the nomination of civil servants to perpetuate a self-serving system has created an endemic system that negatively affects the quality of public institutions since those actions became institutionalized and systemic.

The research comes with some caveats. As in any statistical analysis, the data was restricted to those available during the period covered for the sample countries. As such,

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[53] https://www.mondaq.com/nigeria/real-estate/1021408/overview-of-property-law-in-nigeria-real-estate-law-in-lagos-nigeria

governance data that are pertinent, such as the Corruption Perception Index, budget allocation to the judiciary systems, the number of contracts enforced, and executive compliance with the rule of law among others were not readily available during the period covered. Regarding the personality traits attributed to presidents, the classification may be perceived as subjective as academic research on the personalities of presidents in Sub-Saharan Africa are very limited unless they had been categorized as dictators such as former President Ugandan, Idi Amin. Furthermore, gray literature was also limited and some of the available articles were repetitive; however, yearly reports from the Freedom House were utilized to cross-check the information and ensure some consistency in how the quality of institutions was reported. Given the limitations of the study, the results cannot confirm universally that the quality of public institutions depends solely on the personality traits of presidents; especially given that the null hypothesis was not rejected for the institutions of "Protection of Property Rights" and "Legal Enforcement of Contracts". Furthermore, as per the discussion, presidents are agents who work in a system of rules and processes which can only be changed incrementally.

The research adds to the work of Yeboah-Assiamah (2016) who argued that strong personalities, defined as "personal ethics and integrity" are essential in strengthening public institutions. The research also builds on the work of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) who argued that system constraints do not allow for presidents to influence the public institutions they oversee while in office. Because change is incremental, if a country consistently selects the presidents of the personality of "Service", their institutions are most likely to improve over time. The research is partially aligned with the work of Araya (2020) who used "personalities of presidents as independent variables" and discussed the need to understand the psychological characteristics of presidents and their performance in improving public institutions.

The result of the study contributes to providing solutions to professionals in international development and is built on existing academic work. Previous research has provided potential solutions such as the need for a more inclusive society (Acemoglu & al, 2012); the need for a combination of strong personalities with personal ethics and integrity, strong organizations which prevent and control corruption, and an active civil society to promote public accountability (Yeboah-Assiamah, 2016); and the need to include personality traits in evaluating the performance of presidents and by extension allowing the population to vote for future presidents with the "ideal" leadership profile (Arana, 2020). The result of the research showed that there was a positive

relationship between presidents with personality traits of "Service" and the institutions of "Judicial Independence", an essential institution that supports the rule of law, constraining the ability of individuals and private firms and public institutions to behave as they please and to be treated equality by the judicial system. Presidents with the personality traits of "Authoritative" have a negative relationship with improving Judicial Independence.

While the research cannot confirm a relationship between presidential power and the two institutions – "Protection of Property Rights" and "Legal Enforcement of Contracts" – as the null hypothesis was not rejected – the discussion supported that heads of state have an influence on the quality of both institutions given that the quality of the "Protection of Property Rights" and "Legal Enforcement of Contracts" is dependent on the independence of the judicial system. Furthermore, the independent variable $Lead_{service}$ was statistically significant in both cases with p-values of .02 for the Protections of Property Rights (Table 20, Test 5) and a p-value of .00 for the Legal Enforcement of Contracts (Table 24, Test 5), implying that heads of state have an influence on the quality of those institutions. The Regulation of Political Participation $Political_{rules}$, whether unregulated or regulated, did not directly affect the institution of the Protection of Property Rights but it had a positive influence on the Legal Enforcement of Contracts where it was statistically significant with a p-value of .05. The Competitiveness of Participation in the political process, $Political_{rivalry}$ was not statically significant for contract enforcement (p-value=.97), but it was significant for the implementation of the rule law.

With the addition of Kenya and Tanzania, personality traits of "Service" had a positive influence on the Legal Enforcement of Contracts as the p-value remained statistically significant. The same could not be reported in the Protection of Property Rights. As per table 22, not only the null hypothesis could not be rejected, the p-value was not statistically significant despite being enshrined in the constitutions of the sample countries but affected by customary practices and corruption in most countries.

It can be concluded that the personality traits of presidents mattered for strengthening public institutions and other system constraints are statistically significant in the process. With this information, practitioners can commit more resources to seek the commitment of presidents to promote an independent judicial system as the application of the rule of law is a deterrent to corruption.

VII.   CONCLUSION

The research focuses on understanding the role of presidential power in strengthening public institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa and uses the Nieburg Value Continuum Paradigms of Leadership (Nieburg, 1991) to categorize the personality traits of presidents. I argue that the personality traits of heads of state are presidential traits are important in understanding their decision-making process, and more specifically their influence on strengthening the quality of public institutions. Derived from the work of Douglas North (1990), public institutions, the dependent variables, are defined as Judicial Independence, Protection of Property Rights, and Legal Enforcement of Contracts and are run individually in the regression analysis. The main independent variable is the personality traits of presidents. Other independent variables are included to account for the governance and political system in which a president operates.

The regression analysis, from the original sample (n=6), shows that presidents with "Service" traits have the power to positively influence the judicial system, though, that influence decreases when executive constraints such as regulation of participation in the political process, the competitiveness of the political process, and competitiveness in selecting a president are included in the equation. The analysis demonstrates that presidents do not have an influence on the institutions of Protection of Property Rights and Legal Enforcement of Contracts as the null hypothesis of both regression analysis were rejected; however, in both cases " $Lead_{service}$ " is statistically significant, supporting the relationship between presidential power and the quality of those institutions. Moreover, both institutions are also impacted by the decisions made to strengthen or weaken the independence of the judicial system. When the sample size increased to eight countries (n=8), the analysis remained true for Judicial Independence and Legal Enforcement of Contracts. In regard to the institution of Protection of Property Rights, the p-value was not statically significant; as a result, it implied that presidents did not have an influence on the quality of the public institution under review despite the prerogatives given by the laws given in the zoning of land use for public utility.

The argument put forth by the research is that leaders, at the front of any society and as part of the political elites, are to make a difference during their time in office. Their legacy matters – especially when it comes to strengthening essential public institutions for a well-functioning society. Therefore, understanding their personality traits is not only important to support the reform

agenda as it comes to the rule of law in Sub-Saharan Africa, and to promote democratic institutions as presidents with personality traits of "Service" tend to be more inclusive in their approach. Therefore, understanding their personality traits is important to support the reform agenda as it comes to the rule of law in Sub-Saharan Africa, and to promote democratic institutions.

Presidents with personality traits of "Service" tend to be more inclusive in their approach. They are perceived as more "legitimate", "moral authority" and promoters of a governance structure with checks and balances. Presidents of "Service" understand that successful performance is dependent on nominating based on qualifications and ethics, on promoting excellence, and on the long-term capacity building of the system, which can be done thru professional training and strengthening the educational system. Presidents of "Service" tend to lay the foundation for more democratic political institutions, promote the rule of law, and oblige the peaceful transfer of power in their countries (as per the legacy of Seretse Khama, Elias Phisoana Ramsemu, Ali Seibu, Mahamadou Issoufou, Olusegun Obasanjo to name a few from the sample countries). Presidents with "Authority" traits tend to be single rulers. They promote a system of patronage and mismanagement, minimize the role of the justice system with executive interference, and destroy the foundation of a democratic system with abusive arrests and silencing of the opposition. They promote a system of patronage and mismanagement, minimize the role of the justice system with executive interference, and destroy the foundation of a democratic system with abusive arrests, which includes silencing the opposition. They "fear" efficient bureaucracy as shown by the Mobutu's reign where judges and prosecutors were perceived as corrupt.

The analysis acknowledged the role of the system in which presidents operate, limiting their ability to change the quality of the institutions overnight and reducing their inclination for a one-man show. Institutional change comes in small increments. As such, it is important to integrate the personality traits of presidents into the capacity-building strategies of public institutions and to conduct further studies on the influence of personality traits on good governance practices. Populations need to be better informed when they cast their votes during national and local elections as personality traits matter, so those elected can propose policies to strengthen public institutions and consolidate the role of the public service.

The research question is "Can presidential power change the narrative?". The arguments made in this research show that they can positively change the narrative if they have the personality trait of "Service". Because countries are led by presidents, who are agents of their population and

who navigate within a structure historically defined by the group, it is important to understand their personality traits so a tailored approach to their leadership styles can be proposed to improve the quality of public institutions, even during an "Authoritative" regime, while strengthening system constraints for better public accountability. As such, the personality traits should be part of more studies to expand on the subject matter and to support the work of practitioners in crafting sustainable development solutions.

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